# The Open Court

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE

**Devoted to the Science of Religion, the Religion of Science, and the Extension of the Religious Parliament Idea**

Founded by EDWARD C. HEGELER

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ANDRE MARIE AMPERE

*Frontispiece to The Open Court.*

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## THE SESQUICENTENNIAL OF AMPERE

BY MAYNARD SHIPLEY

NINETEEN hundred twenty-five marks the hundred and fiftieth year since the birth of André Marie Ampère, one of the great names in the history of physics. The man who established the identity between electricity and magnetism, and in whose honor the unit of electrical current is named, was born near Lyons, France, in 1775, and died at Marseilles in 1836. Less narrowly specialized in his interests than most scientists, he did distinguished work in mathematics, read widely in history, general literature and philosophy, and brought his life-work to a culmination by his *Essay on the Philosophy of Science.*

As a small child unacquainted with numbers, Ampère showed his mathematical bent by trying to re-invent arithmetic and geometry by arrangements of pebbles and biscuit crumbs on the ground. His father, observing this, stopped teaching him Latin and began his instruction in mathematics instead. But the little André, discovering that he must know Latin to read such masters as Euler and Bernouilli, taught himself the language unaided.

The French Revolution cost the elder Ampère's life on the guillotine, and plunged his son into an apathy of despair from which he was aroused, a year later, only by the accidental acquaintance with some botanical letters. From the study of botany and the other natural sciences he was swerved by an absorption in the classic writers. Being twenty-one, and ripe for both experiences, he then announced himself a poet and fell in love with Julie Carron, whom he married three years later. In 1804, after five years of happiness, she died, leaving Ampère with a four-year-old son who grew up to be a distinguished philologist and the introducer of the German and Scandinavian folk-epics into France.

Ampère never fully recovered from his wife's death, though he outlived her by thirty-two years. He persevered in his studies, however, and in the very year of her loss he was appointed to a lowly position on the teaching staff of the Paris Polytechnic school, through the recommendation of Delambre, who had been attracted by a little work of the young man's, published two years previously, proving the mathematical chances against the habitual gambler.

In 1820, when he was in the midst of his physical researches and had been professor of mathematics at the Polytechnic School for eleven years, and a member of the Institute for six, Ampère heard of Oersted's discovery that a magnetic needle is acted upon by a voltaic current. A week later he presented a paper to the Academy giving a full exposition of this and similar effects. He was the first to show that two parallel conductors traveling in the same direction attract each other. He was also the inventor of the astatic needle, which made possible the modern astatic galvanometer. In 1824 he became professor of experimental physics at the College of France, and developed his work in electromagnetism, which he called electrodynamics.

Ampère's character was singularly naive and childlike, and many stories—some apocryphal—are told of his simplicity and absent-mindedness. On one occasion he started to work out a sum on the side of an omnibus which was standing near the sidewalk, when suddenly the bus began to move and Ampère had to run after it to copy his figures. Another time he picked up a pebble to examine it and at the same time pulled his watch out of his pocket to see the time; after looking at both, he threw away the watch and put the pebble in his pocket!

Modern physics owes a great deal to this child-hearted, simple, emotional man, and has well named one of her standard measurements in recognition of his services to her.

# COMING CHANGES IN CULTURAL RELATIONS[1]

BY MARTIN SCHUTZE

DURING the past week, many of us, librarians and publishers, scholars and men and women actively concerned in fostering culture, have met in the rooms of the exhibition of German books and portfolios to examine those beautiful works of authorship and craftsmanship, to gain a clearer view of the recent trend of ideas, and to exchange opinions and suggestions. Today, at the close of the exhibition, stimulated by the spirit of goodfellowship and of disinterested devotion to the ideals of civilization, it is natural and fitting that we should shake off at least a part of the grievous burden of discouragement which has lately made our steps heavy and uncertain. For us, the exhibition, more than any other recent event, has marked a happy and promising change in international relations.

There are signs of a new and far-reaching cultural impulse in America. President Butler, in his address of welcome at the recent meeting of the Modern Language Association in Columbia University, expressed the view that the rising tendency in the university study of the modern languages and literatures was to transform the departments of German into departments of Germany, the departments of French into departments of France, and so forth; and he strongly endorsed this tendency. He qualified, indeed, his view by calling it a heresy. But he is so well-known as a conservative man, and in such close touch with the main currents in university education, that one is justified in assuming that his heresy, publicly expressed, will be the orthodoxy of tomorrow.

It is already orthodoxy in the largest national unit of the world. President Butler really restated in his own graphic and forceful terms the gist of the recommendations of the British Commission on

[1] An address delivered at a farewell luncheon given on the last day of the exhibition of 12,000 German books and reproductions of works of art and old illuminated texts, January 14th, 1925, at the Hotel Atlantic, Chicago.

Higher Education, formulated in its recent report. According to this report, based on a comprehensive investigation, modern language study in the British Empire should be no longer limited to the different national literatures as such, isolated, as it were, in a cultural vacuum, but be extended to include the main factors of the cultural environments in which those literatures developed, as the arts, the art-craft, architecture, philosophy, history, social conditions.

This transition from a traditional, narrowly formal and verbal view to the view of language as the final storehouse of the entire history of a race foreshadows the coming general introduction into educational practice, of Herder's conception of the universal function of language in the genetic unity of all civilization.

Books are the treasury not only of words, but of the deepest experiences, the best knowledge, the highest faiths and ideals of each people; they are the most complete witnesses to the civilization, the living voice of the spirit, of each race. Out of this conviction, or rather, out of the deepening and widening of the significance of this conviction, has arisen the new aim of modern language study.

There were at the Modern Language Meeting more than a thousand representatives of higher education from the East and the Middle West, and some from the Pacific Coast. One of the principal subjects of conversation was the relation of Germanistics to American culture. Among the leading university teachers the conviction is again finding open expression, that there are only three modern civilizations of absolutely the first rank: the English, the Romance, and the Germanic; and a good will to assist German back to its proper place in American civilization is active in the circles that will ultimately determine the course of higher culture in this country. These men are fully aware of the indissoluble interdependence of the three greatest types of modern civilization; they realize fully the vital injury inflicted on the cultural progress of America by a continued neglect of the works of the German mind; and they are ready to make a reality, more far-reaching and more wholesome than ever before, of the community of the highest values and achievements of humanity.

These men train the teachers in the public schools. Their expanding view of civilization will, partly through their students, partly through the social influence of their words and actions, soon spread to the mind of the public. One must not be impatient. The public mind, overstrained and exhausted by an unprecedented condition of international conflict, has succumbed to a state of inertia which is

slow to yield. That mind, difficult to move at best, requires at the present time, beside the gradual influences of education and reflection, a somewhat dramatic event, an event, the importance, beauty, and significance of which will overcome indifference by the striking freshness and massive force of its appeal.

This exhibition has come at the right time and in the right way. It contains the cream of much of recent German authorship and publication. It represents unsurpassed expertness in the making of books. The perfection of the color reproductions of works of art is unequaled. And the reproductions of the illuminated texts, in linking the present reproducing craftsman with his remote predecessor who made and illuminated the original text, form a bridge spanning the centuries and giving a clear demonstration of the continuity of the highest standards of skill and honor in German workmanship.

The men who brought this collection, at much expense and labor, and by whose unfailing helpfulness and courtesy we all have been touched, and the active members of the American committee have made—I believe this can be said in all soberness—the most momentous advance in the re-establishment of cultural relations between America and Germany. They have vitally promoted the advent, by furnishing the tokens, of a more purposeful sympathy, and of a more substantial vision of a new and greater fellowship, in which all Germans and all Americans who have the highest interests of civilization at heart, can join hands.

# THE NEW CULTURE CONCEPT AND MARXIAN SOCIALISM

BY WILLIAM NATHANSON

MAN is a being in whom two tendencies have always struggled for supremacy; first a tendency to construct things which would make his life more comfortable, and secondly a tendency to discover the meaning and purpose of life.

Because of the first tendency he has been called homo faber, the man of mechanics; and because of the second tendency he has been called homo-sapience, the man of reason. Whenever the tendency of man to make life more comfortable by all manner of inventions becomes strong at the expense of the tendency to deepen life's content and to make it spiritually beautiful, "fabrication" or civilization gains the upper hand over "sapience" or culture, and man becomes empty and spiritually degraded.

In every era, in which only things human have been stressed, natural science and civilization won prominence, for both serve the practical side of life—that side which finds expression only in the concept of utility. That is the form of life to which science pays the closest attention and to which it is devoted with indescribable loyalty.

But when in a certain epoch the superhuman, the spiritual, begins to dominate, when there is an increase of people in whose hearts is found an echo of that "small, still voice" which allows itself to be heard in the soul-depths of the sages of that epoch, then soul-searching and culture predominates. Stress is then laid on the speculative side of life, which regards only values.

Values stand in direct contrast to uses. Objects and events which are useless for the practical side of life, with its superficialities and limitations, are nevertheless invaluable to the speculative side, which is profound and infinite.

Thus Oscar Wilde thanked God for having caused society to incarcerate him, not because of the utilities which prison afforded

him, but because of the great spiritual awakening that prison life brought to him. His hymn of praise to God and his acceptance of prison as a grant of favor came from the realization that all the pains and trials which beset him "in battalions" led to the revelation of new values in life. Life acquired for him an entirely new meaning.

And only that human activity can be truly termed culture which aims above all to become aware of the meaning and value of life, of the essence and purposiveness of the universe.

Civilization differs from culture in its emphasis upon things human instead of things superhuman, things mundane instead of things supermundane, practical rather than speculative. Civilization is concerned with the material aspect of the universe; culture seeks to identify itself with the innermost aspect of reality.

The second half of the nineteenth century is marked by the greater and more powerful role assumed by civilization as against culture. Between, approximately, 1850 and 1900 civilization dominated almost uninterruptedly the spirit and soul, the heart and mind of humanity. That was the period when man threw himself without reserve into the quest for well-being, thinking that therein he would find happiness. He looked upon all the discoveries and inventions of the lightning strides of science merely as the means for increasing the comforts of his earthly life, and of lending to his external existence more glow and luster.

Man abandoned the quest for spiritual values coming from the great world within to reap the full harvest of his victory over the external world. He was taken away from his real self by the many triumphs over inanimate nature. She who had been silent for milleniums began to speak and to reveal her many secrets. All the hitherto undreamed of achievements in the realms which are devoted mainly to the material world estranged man from the spiritual world, which stretches into the depths and knows of no length or breadth. That world, in which the entire interest was given only to the significant, the everlasting, and to all that made for profound and impressive experience, became subject to a world in which the chief role was taken by the immediate and transitory and in which pleasure and ease were the goal of every human activity. Man became blind to everything that gave life an inner beauty and glory, and to that which could have opened up for him an inexhaustible fountain of true bliss.

With all its magnificent attainments in its various spheres of human activity, the nineteenth century cannot boast of many achievements in the cultural sphere. Particularly in its latter half, the nineteenth century produced nothing which could refresh anew the human soul and which could, as if by magic, elevate the human spirit into the infinite heavens, and make man feel a certain relation between himself and the world above him. Yet this is just what Spinoza did in the seventeenth century and Kant, Fichte, and Hegel toward the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the nineteenth century.

Since then humanity sacrificed almost its entire energy for its material satisfaction. Its greatest purpose and highest aim became the conquest of the external world, with a view toward deriving from it all that could help to make human life more comfortable, more pleasant, and more contented. The foremost if not the sole aim of the leaders of humanity during the last epoch, was only to conquer and exploit nature in such a way as to multiply the utilities which man could draw from her. In this period, civilization progressed very rapidly, with all its tangible results and effective utilities. As in the growth of civilization and its increase of knowledge and learning, the human intellect always played the greatest part, so the nineteenth century placed great stress on the intellectual and logical side of human culture, expecting that in time, man with pure intellect and clear logic, would see everything and account for everything in a logical, mathematical manner.

## II

The main branches of culture are philosophy, religion, morality and art.

These four branches of human endeavor in the nineteenth century and especially the first two began almost to wilt away. Very characteristic of the nineteenth century are the following phrases in which the great pathologist Virchow raged at philosophy. "Philosophy," he says, "was my enemy, from which I have fortunately been saved; for it lured me to speculations full of dreams. But away from philosophy I have taught myself to peer faithfully through my microscope at facts as they are."

Such a view of philosophy was a dam in the way of the stream of culture. It tore man away from all eternal values, the moral value, which is the highest and most absolute in the world, included.

The query of man—how much will it avail his temporal life—became much more imposing than the question—how valuble is it for his being in eternity. In the eyes of man that view destroyed the last morsel of such independent value which gave sustenance to the life of him who saw in the independence of spirit the goal of everything in the universe.

He who does not believe in the independence of spirit cannot believe in his own independence. In all his behavior, in all his joys and sorrows, he must depend upon everything in the world but himself. And wheresoever the independent "I" or profound "self" is not at the root of an experience—that experience brings anything but spiritual joy, and can lead to many things, but not to a higher type of human being. With this denial of the independence of spirit, the last remnant of a logical basis for a desire on the part of man to become a higher and more cultured being, was destroyed. The effort to explain the highest through the lowest and to find a concrete, material expression for all that assumes the term "spirit," was followed by an attempt to translate in a utilitarian manner all the concepts of the higher, the better, and the more beautiful. Thus the query, "what is this thing's true worth?" had to be reduced to "how much can this thing yield in terms of weight and measure?"

Much more than all other values, moral values suffer from this reduction of quality to quantity. For of all the values, the moral is the most distinct from quantity and profoundest in quality; of all the values it is furthest from the arbitrary; more than other values it can exist with a minimum of externality; more than other values it can, in the flash of the eye, yield or snatch away an eternity of bliss, and, more than any of the other values can it be identified with what we understand by the term soul. And whenever the soul is in exile, all the world is enslaved, much as we may strive to free it. "What does it profit a man to free the whole world," asks Santayana, "if his soul is not free? Moral freedom is not an artificial condition, because the ideal is the mother-tongue of both the heart and the senses. All that is requisite is that we should pause in living to enjoy life, and should lift up our hearts to things that are pure goods in themselves, so that once to have found them, no matter what else may betide, may remain a happiness that nothing can sully."

The second half of the nineteenth century did not know of such a love for the pure good which lies hidden in every little furrow and crevice of things, inasmuch as they are an expression of and

through the spiritual reality. It was not aware of the bliss in which the joy and pain of spirit are indistinguishable, and which is a kind of alloy of joy and sorrow, generated from within and entirely free and independent of all that lies external to the self. Such love, such bliss were foreign to the Zeitgeist. It was an epoch which desired to commute all inner things for externals, and to reduce all that we designate by the word soul to something which could be weighed on the apothecary's scale. And the nearer that man was drawn toward the external, and the more thoroughly that the qualitative whole of the soul was quantitatively flitted away, the more completely did man begin to consider uses instead of values. Physical adaptability instead of ethical fitness became the ideal of his conduct.

"The whole of the human world," says Tagore, "throughout its length and breadth, has felt the gravitational pull of a giant planet of greed, with concentric rings of innumerable satellites, causing in our society a marked deviation from the moral orbit. In former times the intellectual and spiritual powers of this earth upheld their dignity of independence and were not giddily rocked on the tides of the money market."

Morality became neglected while materialism and civilization held sway. Independence was perforce lost, and every meaning and value of life vanished and with them every stimulus to spur life toward profundity and loftiness instead of length and breadth.

## III

Materialism then in all its length and breadth mastered human thought in the latter decades of the nineteenth century.

The materialist conception sees in the high and complicated expression of the world an evolution from something lower and simpler. It cannot therefore place before man, whom it regards as the highest and most complex expression of everything in the world, goals and purposes, ideas and ideals which should reach far above man. Materialism desired, and for a short time it really believed that it was actually able to reduce the immaterial and formless, the spiritual and soulful to something, which is genuinely material and concrete, and which has body and form. It endeavored to transmute all that has quality into something that possesses mere quantity. Hence, in the body (excellent enough material for the laboratory) it saw the source and fountain head of the soul. Nothing served to lead materialism to sense the abyss that separates the pleasure

afforded by the satisfaction of bodily desires from the joy and bliss which are experiences of the soul.

For where the very highest is only a degree of development from the lower, where the heavenly is not considered in its essence and reality entirely other than the earthly, the highest endeavors and deepest desires of man cannot lift him so far and high into the upper worlds that he can entirely forget the plane below. From the viewpoint of materialism, the highest cannot differ from the lowest to such a degree that an abyss could be created between them, nor can the lowest, as from the idealist viewpoint, ever be considered as a spark from the highest. The speculations about God, man and the world, do not enjoy free swing, so as to enable the human eye to escape the practical and worldly, and have in mind only the superhuman and divine.

It can therefore be readily understood why the role which civilization played in contrast to culture was greatest and most significant when the effect of materialism was most dominant and extensive. Wherever the diffusion of materialism is widest, there culture is devoured by the tide of civilization.

While materialism reigned supreme in all Europe, the sciences recorded one victory after another over the vast ignorance which persisted in regard to nature and its phenomena. Man became plainly intoxicated with those victories and began to dream that nature would soon lie open before him like a book and demand it be read. At that time Marxian socialism came forth upon the world.

Marxism wove the materialistic Weltanschauung pattern into sociology and economics to such an extent that materialism, under the mask of economic determinism, became the sine qua non of socialism as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels formulated and expounded it. Today Marxism is differently understood, is interpreted in many ways by the various thinkers and leaders of the socialist movement. But so long as they call themselves Marxists, they are agreed among each other that they are philosophical materialists and aligned against idealism. Their agreement is more obvious when they deal with historical materialism—the conception which desires to see in the means of production and in the socio-economical relations in general, the chief factor of human development. Historical materialism stubbornly insists on the possibility to reduce any by degrees, to resolve the highest to the lowest, the spiritual to the material, the animate to the inanimate, the valuable to the useful.

In his book, *Utopian and Scientific Socialism*, Engels writes: "The ultimate cause of all social changes and political revolutions must be sought not in the human brain, not in man's keen insight into external truth and justice, but in the varying phenomena of production and exchange; they are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each epoch."

And in the Communist Manifesto, both Marx and Engels explicitly state that deep intuition is not needed to realize that man's thoughts, opinions, and conceptions, in a word, his consciousness, is changed by every variation of his material existence, of his social relationship, and social life.

## IV

It is possible that just because the great thinkers who came after the Communist Manifesto was written, were gifted with great intuition, they did not take at all seriously the philosophical foundation of Marxism, and paid little attention to materialism in general.

For after all, materialism as a philosophical view of the world was never an outgrowth of philosophy. It was born on the lap of natural science, and for a long time served as an excellent motive force for all the searchings and investigations concerning problems which could sooner or later, in an experimental manner, be positively explained. So soon, however, as philosophy, which deals in the main with questions outside of the bounds of positivity, threw upon materialism its cognizatory rays and peered deep into reality, materialism thawed like ice under the rays of the sun.

How far-reaching the idealistic reaction of the human thought of today has been against science and materialism, Professor Alliota has demonstrated most conclusively in his book, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*. "Pure mechanics," says Professor Alliota, "are then the basis and general form of all physical science; but though, space, time, and motion are necessary, they are not sufficient to exhaust the whole content of external experience. In every natural phenomenon, there will always be found something mechanical; it will therefore be found essential in every branch of physical science to integrate with the help of other explanatory concepts, the universal principles of mechanics which merely present to us the universal form of physical reality, the warp with which he who would weave an intelligible world, cannot dispense. There should, however, be as few as possible of these integrating elements; and it

will always be permissible to attempt to resolve into these four concepts the new phenomena revealed to us by experience, transmuting them into an ideal form in which our intelligence may recognize itself. What, indeed, can be the aim of the age-long work of science, if it be not to bring to light the thought contained in the intimate nature of things?"

Historical materialism can come to no better end than philosophical materialism. For both are products of the same cognition. Both are developments of the self-same bent of thought, results of the self-same quality of human temperament. Therefore, in spite of the fact that Marxism in order to confirm its historical materialism made great effort to nullify all the idealistic philosophers from Plato to Hegel himself upside down, all great philosophers of recent years follow more closely in the footsteps of Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel.

All these philosophers, like Bergson, Wundt, Eucken, James, Royce, Dewey, Mach, Avenarius, Hartmann, Schopenhauer, Muensterberg, Nietzsche, Spencer, and Bradley—who diverge into so many different directions, and from each direction into again as many different viewpoints concerning the relations existing between the world, man and God, all join in their negative attitude toward materialism, in their sharp criticism of materialism as it was formulated by many natural scientists, and as it was, in its historico-materialistic sense, applied in the supposedly strictly scientific foundation of socialism.

Josiah Royce has passed the verdict of present-day philosophy in his *The World and the Individual.* "For us," he says, "Nature is an expression of mental life, and all mental life has an internal meaning, and therefore conscious unity of purpose in every pulse of its existence.

"And for the same reason, we reject a form of doctrine that regards nature as in any sense a realm of the genuinely unconscious, or that supposes the absolute to come to self-consciousness first in man, or that conceives the process of evolution as one wherein the life of the natural, as a whole, grows from the darkness of obscurity and unconscious purpose to the daylight of self-possessed reason. Our general theory of Being simply forbids every such interpretation of Nature. All life, everywhere, insofar as it is life, has conscious meaning, and accomplishes a rational end. This is the necessary consequence of Idealism. Where we see inorganic nature seemingly dead, there is, in fact, conscious life just as surely as there is

any Being present in Nature at all. And I insist, meanwhile, that no empirical warrant can be found for affirming the existence of dead material substance anywhere. What we find in inorganic Nature, are processes whose time-rate is faster or slower than those which our consciousness is adapted to read or to appreciate. And we have no empirical evidence of the existence of any, relatively whole, conscious process, which is less intelligent or less rational than our own human processes are."

This revolution in the philosophical thought of the twentieth century should, if there were an appreciable number of serious thinking people among the radical, and especially among the socialist, folks cause them to bethink themselves of the possibility of a Weltanschaung opposed to the materialistic conception, which gives human life a deeper meaning and a greater content. For the newest philosophy was immersed in, and drenched with, all those scientific speculations of the nineteenth century, which drove inevitably to the confirmation of the materialistic Weltanschaung. It had become acquainted in the most intimate manner with all the efforts of triumphant science to drive out the concept of spirit as a first cause and the ultimate aim of all worldly happenings. Out of regard for the gigantic achievements of science, philosophy was for several decades silent. But it did begin to speak anew, and whenever materialism was concerned, to speak over and over again in the very words used by the profoundest thinkers of the distant past.

The very fact that during a stretch of twenty-five centuries, the profoundest thinkers of the world stubbornly held to the idea that the essence of the world cannot be something which has neither will nor reason, neither plan nor compass, ought to have brought to an end, the levity with which the radical, and particularly the socialist ranks treated such conjectures as that an atom is the outcome of an idea and not that an idea is the result of the existence of atoms.

Moreover, now science itself, through its most brilliant representatives, begins to realize that something lacking will and understanding can in no way be considered the cause of something which has will and understanding.

The verdict of science is epitomized in the words of J. Arthur Thomson: "Living transcends all mechanical description."

In regards to life and spirit, there begins to reign a unanimous opinion not only in philosophy but also in science, and that opinion is that life cannot be explained in terms of anything other than life. Says Viscount Haldane: "It is only in terms of life itself that life

can be expressed, and these terms lie outside the words which the physicist has to employ. Of course, physical and chemical conceptions have great value in the observation of the organism. They are needed in order to interpret certain aspects of the taking in and giving out of its energy, aspects which it presents in common with the other objects of external nature. But such aspects are inadequate to the full reality. They are not more than abstractions under which that reality can be properly regarded only if it is remembered that in them no complete or even sufficient account of life is ever given. And end operates quite differently from a cause. Its activity is a present activity—behavior and not causation. Our knowledge about it is determined by a different set of conceptions."

This means that all causes which have brought life to the world, all factors that motivate life, lie hidden within life itself, and by no means in something foreign to life. Life is a self-reproducing process. J. Arthur Thomson, again well says "for certain purposes it is not amiss to think of the organism as an engine, but it is a self-stoking, self-repairing, self-preservative, self-adjusting, self-increasing, self-reproducing machine."

It is the same with spirit.

Spirit likewise cannot be explained by any incident outside of itself. The only definition that can be given for spirit is that spirit is spirit. Spirit is that force which is able to produce itself and all else and which cannot be brought forth from any other substance; and outside of spirit there is nothing, for whatsoever in the world we should choose to name cannot be placed outside of the spirit, since the naming and the calling themselves are spiritual processes —expressions of human thought. And just as it is impossible to imagine seas and rivers without water—for it is the water which forms the river and sea-beds in the soil, so it is impossible to imagine anything without spirit; for an object is primarily a consciousness, a concept, and it is the spirit which carves out in us and around us the concept and the consciousness of the object.

With just this in mind, Bradley writes the last paragraph of his great book *Appearance and Reality*. "And Reality is one experience, self-pervading and superior to mere relations. Its character is opposite of that fabled extreme which is barely mechanical, and it is, in the end, the sole perfect realization. We may fairly close this work then by insisting that Reality is spiritual. There is a great saying of Hegel's, a saying too well known, and one which without some explanation I should not like to endorse. But I will end with some-

thing not very different, something perhaps more certainly the message of Hegel. Outside of spirit, there is not and cannot be, any reality, and the more that anything is spirtual, so much the more is it veritably real."

In the same vein Professor Alliota, also speaks, when he says: "The reality of nature presupposes the reality of consciousness as its essential epistemological basis. Thus we do but move in a vicious circle when we try to derive thought from the world of mechanics or energetics, since there is nothing left of that world when the concepts, principles, and ideas used by conscious activity in its construction have been eliminated.

Thus write the profoundest philosophers and scientists of our time in the spirit of Philosopher Berkeley's declaration of long ago —that matter is of little use for natural philosophy.

What does this mean but that quantity can be qualitatively evaluated but never vice versa.

The tendency of the twentieth century is toward the full reaffirmation of the hypothesis that quality cannot be reduced to quantity. This tendency has led the thinkers of our day to invest time itself with quality and differentiation.

Time has ceased to be a homogeneous mental emanation, a pure abstraction in which events occur. Instead, it is gradually being seen as in a metaphysical womb whence all events are urged forth. Time itself becomes concrete. Accordingly its three expressions—the past, the present, and the future—are each bound to have a certain individuality. And thus a previous expression cannot completely mould an expression following and by no means explain or predict it.

Such a concept of time and its resultant demand for the differentiation between time and space as thought entities were already intimated by Hegel. He accepted that "mentality" in which Kant frames his concepts of time and space, but he insisted on qualitative differentiation which time and not space possess.

Until Bergson came forth with creative evolution and Einstein with the theory of relativity, our century did not pause to think of Hegel's highly significant remark about the specific properties and about the uniqueness of time.

In their treatment of time, both Hegel and Bergson come to somewhat similar conclusions.

In this close approach is indicated, or reflected, the nearness between the thought trends of the beginning of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. In both periods, much impor-

tance was attached to quality. But between these two periods, the latter half of the nineteenth century injected its emphasis of quantity instead of quality, and also intellectual abstraction instead of sentient concreteness. Marxism fell into this pitfall which as we have seen, present-day thinking carefully avoids. Philosophy and science are gradually coming together on this point.

And since there are no higher courts of issue than science and philosophy which together are the expression of culture, the "radical sociology" with its zest for considering itself a science will therefore be unable to both forsake its cultural heritage and at the same time to stubbornly tread its materialistic measures, when all the present march of thought is permeated with idealism or spiritualism. And the more thoroughly idealism will pervade the human mind, the more completely will culture dominate human activity, control human life and direct the growth and influence of civilization.

# THE CENTENARY OF THE DEATH OF FRIEDRICH AUGUST WOLF

BY WALTER WOODBURN HYDE

A HUNDRED years ago last August there died in Marseilles the great classical scholar and greater classical teacher, Friedrich August Wolf. To most educated men his name is now connected only with the scientific presentation of the *Homeric Question*, the influence of which has permeated all branches of classical, biblical, and historical investigation since. But when we consider that Wolf always regarded his activity in publishing as secondary, that he left behind no comprehensive work, that all his books, including the famous *Prolegomena* itself, were thrown off incidentally to his teaching, appearing for the most part as editions of the classics for the use of his students, and that his supreme interest was teaching, in the course of which he built up a science of his chosen subject, we should rather be interested in Wolf the teacher, than in Wolf the scholar. For it was the enthusiasm which he infused into his students, many of whom—Philip Karl Buttmann, Ludwig Friedrich Heindorf, Immanuel Bekker, August Boeckh, Gottfried Bernhardy—were to carry on his methods and ideals in the following generation, which made him the foremost teacher of his day. But beyond the influence which he exerted on his immediate circle, it was the revolution which he made in classical studies, the bringing into prominence of a new instrument of education—what he called *philology*—and above all the spirit of enquiry which has pervaded classical education since, that still give him so prominent a place in the history of scholarship.

Whatever we may think of the merits of his contribution to the critical study of Homer, we must admit that in the domain of historical criticism as applied to ancient literature Wolf was not an originator. For almost a century before his *Prolegomena* appeared

in 1795, Richard Bentley, England's foremost classical scholar, by his controversy with Charles Boyle over the origin of the letters of Phalaris culminating in his *Dissertation on the Epistles of Phalaris and the Fables of Aesop*, which Parson called the "immortal dissertation," the expanded final edition of which appeared in 1699 when the Cambridge scholar was only thirty-seven, had laid down for all time the principles on which criticism must be applied to ancient records, thus marking a new epoch in modern scholarship. Wolf merely applied the same principles to the greatest of poets, while Bentley showed that Phalaris, the fifth century B. C. tyrant of Agrigentum, could not have composed the famous letters, but rather a Sophist of the age of decline who had borrowed his name, so Wolf tried to prove that the Iliad and Odyssey were not the work of a single poet Homer, but rather made up of popular ballads, their unity being merely the result of subsequent editors. It is hardly fair, therefore, to say that his novel theory was the outgrowth of the scepticism of traditional views and institutions and the glorification of the common man resulting from the French Revolution. His younger contemporary Niebuhr went a step further in applying the same critical and scientific method for the first time—it had been adumbrated only faintly by his predecessor the Dutch scholar Perizonius—to historical records in his *Roemische Geschichte*, the first two volumes of which appeared in 1811 and 1812 respectively. While wrongly believing that the early Roman legends had been transmitted from generation to generation in poetic lays—a theory soon to be proven untenable by Sir G. C. Lewis and now abandoned—Niebuhr was enabled by his criticism of the sources to separate the early period from the legends which had beclouded it since Roman days and to leave us a residue of truth. Still later, Dean Milman, in his *History of the Jews*, which appeared in 1829, extended the method to sacred history, showing that the "chosen people" in the light of our knowledge of modern Semitic peoples were developed from an ordinary Oriental tribe. Since then these principles have been extended to every field concerned with the past and its records, finally entering the domain of Christianity itself, until now science has become merely the name of a method characteristic of the spirit of investigation everywhere, in which criticism has replaced authority.

But Wolf did more than apply a new method to a restricted field. To quote from J. E. Sandys' *History of Classical Scholarship*, "he was the first to present a systematic description of the vast fabric

that he called by the name of *Alterthums-Wissenschaft*, to arrange and review its component parts, and to point to a perfect knowledge of the many-sided life of the ancient Greeks and Romans, as the final goal of the modern study of the ancient world. He raised that study to the rank of a single comprehensive and independent science." Wolf used to say that "the goal of the study of antiquity was the knowledge of man in antiquity." That knowledge to him was comprehended in the term *philology*, which he regarded as "a purely human education, the elevation of all the powers of mind and soul to a beautiful harmony of the inner and outer man." If such be the goal he argued that we must turn to antiquity for instruction and that the interpretation of the ancient languages and history trained the mind. This idea he pursued so successfully that he merited Niebuhr's encomium of the "eponymous hero" of subsequent German philologists; and the even greater praise of his English admirer Mark Pattison that he was "the true author of modern classical culture." For the position that the classics still hold in this degenerate age of materialism both in Europe and America is largely the result of his life efforts. It is profitable, therefore, a century after his passing, to review briefly some of the chief events in his academic career at Halle and Berlin, and to appraise the achievements which have made him one of the great teachers and scholars of modern times.

We suffer from no lack of materials for a view of Wolf's life and activity. On his last birthday he began an autobiographical sketch, *De vita et studiis F. A. Wolfii, Philologi*, addressed to his friends and former students in Germany and Switzerland, but made little progress with it. But we have two excellent biographies written from different points of view—one, *Leben und Studien Friedr. Aug. Wolf's, des Philologen*, appearing in two volumes nine years after his death, written by his son-in-law, W. Koerte, which is naive, intimate, and sympathetic; the other, *Friedr. Aug. Wolf in seinem Verhältnisse zum Schulwesen und zur Pädagogik dargestellt*, appearing in two volumes in 1861-1862, by J. F. J. Arnoldt, accurate and unimaginative, the true Prussian official's account of his subject. There is also the brief *Erinnerungen an Friedrich August Wolf*, published only a year after Wolf had departed, by the loving and reverent pen of one of his Swiss pupils, Professor Hanhart of Basel. From these and minor sources, we can get a fairly complete picture of the man and his career.

Wolf was born February 15, 1759, in Hainrode at the foot of the Harz in the province of Hannover in the same year in which Porson was born in England and two hundred years, lacking three days, after the birth of the French classicist Casaubon in Geneva. Like Porson and his older contemporary Winckelmann, Wolf was of humble extraction, his father the village schoolmaster and organist, his mother the daughter of the clerk of a neighboring town. He owed his spiritual awakening to his mother, who was musical, thus again exemplifying Buffon's famous truism *qu'en général les enfants tiennent de leur mére leurs qualités intellectuelles et morales,* and to his ambitious father the beginnings of his systematic education. Before he was two or knew his letters, his father had taught him many Latin words and a feeling for grammatical relationship, and thus early he showed as precocious a memory as Porson or Macaulay. At four he could read, write, sing and play on the piano. When he was eight, the family moved to the nearby Nordhausen where the father reached his highest preferment, assistant-master in a girls' school. On entering the gymnasium there Wolf already knew the rudiments of Greek and French, and his memory had improved so that he could repeat fifteen lines on hearing them once.

Wolf was to stay ten years at Nordhausen, until he was ready for the university. There he had three successive masters, each of whom impressed him differently. The first was Johann Andreas Fabricius, author of an *Outline of a General History of Learning* (1752-4), and then a man over seventy whose mode of instruction was "to pour out information in full streams" over the heads of his pupils. He was succeeded in 1769, two years after Wolf's entrance, by a real student, J. C. Halle, who, two years later at the age of thirty-eight, was to fall a victim to his zeal for study. Lastly, there was one Johann Friedrich Albert, regarded by teachers and students alike as an ignoramus and negligent of his duties, since under his direction the school was closed for months at a time. Under him Wolf fell into bad habits, especialy through the influence of Frankenstein, the music master, whom he regarded with affection and later called a "diamond in the rough." Heretofore a model of industry Wolf now was regarded as an example of laziness. Evidently he had learned all the Greek and Latin his teachers could impart, and so he began the study of modern languages with his new-found friend—French, Italian, Spanish, English, and Dutch, at the same time taking Hebrew lessons with a Jew of the village. He had to read his Don Quixote with the help of a Dutch translation in lieu

of a Spanish lexicon, and for his Italian he borrowed a dictionary for a brief time and copied out all the words he did not recognize from his knowledge of Latin and French. He also learned to play a half-dozen musical instruments, to sing and to dance, and he even fell in love with his dancing teacher, a young widow. But during the last two years of his stay at Nordhausen, he renounced his frivolous habits and now, though nominally still at school, spent most of his time at home with his books, working till long after midnight in a cold room, his feet in a basin of water and one eye bandaged to rest the other. He read all the books in the school library, borrowed others from the teachers, the village minister and doctor, and carried quantities more home from the library of one of the masters at Ilfeld. He read the classics with feverish industry, committing several books of Homer to memory.

Now at eighteen he was ready for Göttingen, attracted there by the renown of the classicist Christian Gottlob Heyne, its chief ornament. He matriculated on April 8, 1877, as *studiosus philologiae*. A year before he had visited the town on foot to find out the requirements of entrance, armed with a letter to Heyne, then Prorector and Professor of Eloquence and Director of the Philological Seminary. Wolf never forgot his reception by the great Greek scholar and the latter's seeming contempt for his own chosen field. Asked who had advised him to study what he called philology, Wolf replied it had been his ambition from childhood to study the classics. Heyne retorted that he should study either theology or law, and dip into the classics only in moments of leisure. But Wolf replied that he was ready to make any sacrifice in order to gratify his taste for "the greater intellectual freedom" furnished by the classics. His idea of freedom aroused Heyne's ridicule and he was admonished that "the young must obey their elders," and that "the classics led only to starvation," pointing his remarks by letters lying on his table written by rectors and co-rectors of schools all over Germany, who were destitute because of indulging their tastes for the classics. He added that conditions were little better even in Göttingen, and that there were only four or six chairs of philology in Germany. When Wolf answered that he aspired to one of these, he was curtly dismissed. But Heyne was evidently impressed by his wide reading, for he invited him to attend his lectures on Homer the following year.

Wolf was now again at Göttingen to be enrolled as a student of philology, a *Fach* which the Prorector Baldinger told him existed

only in his own imagination, and advised him, as Heyne had done before, to enroll as *studiosus theologiae* or *juris* if he really wished to become a school-master. But he finally had his way, being the first student of philology at Göttingen or anywhere else—except a few isolated cases at Erlangen between 1749-1777. Thus his matriculation marks an epoch in the history of classical learning. Wolf again visited Heyne, now Rector, and was more curtly received than before. Heyne's reception taught Wolf a lesson he never forgot. In later life when Professor at Halle he never allowed himself to be too busy to see students, believing that the first call on a teacher's time was their needs. He even went to the other extreme, contrary to all academic custom, visiting his students in their rooms, taking long walks with them in vacation, and lending them books. Hanhart says he frequently saw Wolf in bookshops at Halle buying back books which he had lent to unscrupulous students who sold them. He gave farewell dinners to those who were leaving which lasted long after midnight. But such intimacy never bred disrespect, for every one of his students remained his enthusiastic admirer.

At the first meeting of Heyne's course on Homer, Wolf took down a list of the books recommended and immediately collected them from the library. Frequently he spent from twenty to thirty hours in preparation for the next lecture, as no student ever took his teacher's suggestions more in earnest. But he soon found that Heyne's methods were superficial and aimed chiefly at reading the Iliad through, accompanied by little textual criticism. When at the end of the fifth week only the first book had been read, Wolf left the class in disgust. Just as Gibbon found his fourteen months at Magdalen "unprofitable," and left for Lausanne to carry on his reading alone, Wolf found his five weeks with Heyne unprofitable and continued his studies by himself in his room, following the habit he had learned at Nordhausen. Heyne soon discovered his absence and took his revenge at the beginning of the next semester by refusing Wolf admittance to his class in Pindar on the ground it was *privatim* and open only to advanced students. Wolf's demand for an examination was unheeded and as a consequence he renounced all lectures. He likened Heyne's seminarists to the Muses, and the Professor himself to Apollo. A little later, however, Heyne invited him to join the Seminar on completing the usual written exercise, but Wolf disdainfully refused. This was certainly an unfortunate policy on the part of Wolf, whatever Heyne's treatment of him had

been. Though lacking in originality and charm, still Heyne was the best classical teacher of his day. Wolf's attitude toward him was merely the first instance of what was to be so prominent in his later life at Halle and especially Berlin. At the former place his supercilious manner was to alienate all his colleagues but one—Semler, for whom he had a real affection; at Berlin the same temper in an aggravated form was to embitter his whole nature and destroy his influence with colleagues and students alike. But we must admit with Mark Pattison that Wolf was an unusual student. Not since Gibbon had entered Oxford in 1754 with a "stock of learning which might have puzzled a doctor" had any student so gifted as Wolf entered any university.

On retiring from Heyne's influence Wolf became very industrious. He seldom appeared on the street, never attended a *kneipe* during his student days, and never indulged in the coarser pleasures of student life. His only intimates were among the faculty, his only recreation walking. He was so jealous of his time that he dressed in three minutes and avoided the necessity of going to the barber by having his hair cut short and wearing a wig. This along with his mantle, which the students called his *pallium philologicum*, made him look far older than he was. He read so late into the night that by the end of October he became very ill, recovering only with difficulty, his sickness necessitating his return home for a long rest. Thereafter he worked only to midnight, and reduced his twenty pipes a day to only one, smoked after breakfast—a custom he kept up ever after. Such industrious habits do not seem to have been exceptional among poor and ambitious students of the eighteenth century in Germany. We are told that Heyne himself, when a student at Leipsic, slept only two nights a week for a whole semester in order to use books which he could borrow only for brief periods. During his second semester, on his return from his enforced rest, Wolf applied himself to the Homeric poems with the greatest care, and it was at this time that he thought he detected differences in tone and language in the various books, which was later to bear fruit in his launching of the *Homeric Question*. In the third semester he showed his range of interest by hearing lectures outside his main subject, on natural history, psychology, philosophy, church history and the New Testament. But in his fourth and last term, apart from a course in the Odyssey with Glandorf, he heard no more lectures. By that time he was giving lectures himself in Greek,

Latin, and English, which indicates that he intended to habilitate as a Privat-dozent at Göttingen.

Heyne, however, was unwilling to have him as a colleague, and recommended Wolf to be Assistant Rector of a select boys' school at Ilfeld. Here he remained from October, 1779, to April, 1782, during which years his ideas about Homer and Plato were slowly forming. Thus, in 1780, when only twenty-one, he offered a Berlin publisher a *Dissertation on the Origin of the Homeric Poems*, but was advised to wait. In the next year, he became Rector at Ilfeld and in 1782 was married. It was in the latter year that he published his first work on Plato, the text of the *Symposium* with German notes, written to arouse interest in his immediate students. In its preface he adroitly referred to Frederick the Great and his minister of education, von Zedlitz, as the "philosopher on the throne" and "enlightened minister," respectively, which was later to bear fruit in a call to Halle. Meanwhile, from April, 1782, to December of that year, he was Rector at a school in Osterrode in the Harz. His success at Ilfeld and Osterrode brought him two calls as Rector of gymnasia, one at Hildesheim, the other at Gera. It was at this time that he was invited also to Halle as Professor of Philology and Pedagogy. As the salary there was only three hundred thalers, and the one at Gera was nine hundred and included a seat in the Consistory, Wolf visited Semler at Halle for advice. To his argument that Gera was a "fat land where the cows' bellies touched the grass," Semler answered that Gera then "was good for cows, but Halle for scholars." As Wolf found that his teaching at Gera might be trammeled by certain religious requirements, he finally decided on Halle. Three months after beginning his work there his salary was increased one-half from the added Professorship of Eloquence.

On coming to Halle, April 3rd, 1783, Wolf was twenty-four years old and with a reputation as a successful teacher. In fact, he was at the threshold of a splendid career, for he was to remain for twenty-three years, the golden years of promise and accomplishment. To understand his success at Halle it is necessary to know something of the conditions obtaining there in the time of Frederick the Great. It was, in a word, a critical time in the history of German university education. The initial impulse of the Renaissance had long since spent itself and a condition of atrophy had characterized classical studies in Germany and elsewhere for over a century and a half. This state of decay had been somewhat overcome in Germany from about the middle of the eighteenth century on, by

the labors of our great classical scholars: Johann Mathias Gesner at Göttingen (1734-61), Johann August Ernesti at Leipsic (1742-81), Johann Joachim Winckelmann, the founder of the science of Classical Archaeology, who lived most of his later life in Rome (1755-68), and Heyne, Gesner's successor at Göttingen (1763-1812). Of these Gesner was the real prototype of Wolf and a great teacher and scholar whose influence had reinvigorated classical learning. He had come to Göttingen at its foundation and was Professor of Poetry and Eloquence and head of the Classical Seminary there for twenty-seven years. He had outlined his encyclopaedia of philology, philosophy, and history as a syllabus for his lectures and at Göttingen represented the New Humanism as opposed to the Old—teaching the classical languages not to imitate their style, but to assimilate their content. He was the prophet of the new era and the precursor of Lessing, Winckelmann, Goethe, and Wolf. He had an able coadjutor in his reforms and ideas in the person of Ernesti at Leipsic.

In the years just preceding Wolf's coming to Halle there had grown up in German education a new tendency, which, though ultimately derived from the influence of Rousseau and Locke, was to take, unfortunately, the form of a reaction against the classics. German education was, indeed, in a period of *Sturm und Drang*. The representatives of the new tendency aimed at a more modern and practical training, and so found fault with the pedantic methods of the traditional curriculum, the predilection of the classicists for details of grammar. Theology, as well as the classics, was to suffer in the new demand for a more up-to-date instruction. To them, Rousseau's slogan "back to nature" meant the teaching of "realities," in which Greek and Latin were at best merely the keys by which the treasures of ancient literature could be unlocked. The whole movement naturally found a ready response among the people and the press. Its chief representative was J. B. Basedow, who, in 1774, had formed at Dessau a school known as the *Philanthropinum*, where the new pedagogy was nurtured, the new ideas comprehensively being known as *Philanthropinism*. In 1778 Basedow had left Dessau, he and his followers being the open enemies of classical training. One of the Dessau teachers, Ernst Christian Trapp, had been at Halle since 1779 as Professor of Pedagogy and head of the "Training School" there, and by Wolf's advent there the Philanthropinists were in full sway.

At this time the classics were taught at Halle in the Theological Seminar as ancillary to theology. Since 1757 the Seminar had been in charge of Semler, but in 1778 it was expanded by being connected with the Training School. In 1779 Trapp became Inspector, though Semler continued as its Director. So the fate of the Classics was largely in Trapp's hands, and Trapp was the protagonist of the philanthropists at Halle. His idea was to produce teachers and to make an independent profession of teaching. Humanistic courses formed only part of the scheme, Trapp confining his activities to the pedagogical side. But he was to prove a failure, and it was his resignation which made Wolf's appointment possible and Wolf had been recommended partly to remove the stigma that Halle was not a school of philology. He saw his opportunity for reform and threw himself into his work with vigor. He had nothing but contempt for the superficial Philanthropinists, though praise for the ideas of Locke and Rousseau which they had cheapened.

At first Wolf took too much for granted on the part of his students and got little response. At Göttingen the conditions were different. Gesner and Heyne had long prepared the way for classical study, while at Halle Wolf had no predecessor and the Philanthropinist theories were still strong. Undismayed he gave up the Training School and, in order to conquer hostility to the classics, he lectured only on philology. Like Trapp he saw that better teachers must be trained if the general tone of education was to be raised. To do this and as a supplement to his lecture course he founded in 1787 the Philological Seminary, parallel to the old Theological one, in which to train classical teachers directy. It was to have twenty-four men, each with a stipend of forty thalers for two years, Wolf himself as Director to receive one hundred. No first year man was to be admitted except as an auditor, and none at all without a knowledge of Greek and Latin.

To treat adequately the complex subject of philology, he gave for the first time in 1785 a course on the Encyclopaedia of Philology, as a general introduction to the whole subject of antiquity. He repeated this outline course with additions nine times at Halle and eight more at Berlin. He divided it into four parts: introduction, including the philosophy of grammar, Greek and Latin grammar, interpretation, and criticism; ancient geography, history, chronology, mythology, antiquities, and the history of literature and art; archaeology, epigraphy, and numismatics; and, lastly, the history of all disciplines from the beginning of the middle ages to his time. It was

not until 1807 that this material was published in outline, his famous *Darstellung der Alterthums-Wissenschaft* which we shall mention again later. Wolf began his lectures with the warning that examinations should not be the goal, but that the student should aim to be of use to himself and the state: *perverse studere eosqui examinibus studeant; recte studet qui sibi et vitae studet.* To study liberal studies in an illiberal way was to bring them to a level even below that of the technical arts, and whoever was interested only in passing an examination, did just this. Furthermore, the study of the classics was not for *Brot-studenten,* but only for those who felt the inner call. They should never be pursued for practical purposes; the physician should not study Greek for terminology, nor the theologian nor jurist for practical examples. Nor did Wolf aim to fill his students with information. He had seen the folly of this when a youth at Nordhausen in the case of the garrulous Fabricius. His aim was rather to suggest and stimulate. The student was to do the work, he was merely to direct. At the *Uebungen* of the Seminar they read papers, interpreted and disputed, Wolf having indicated the method at the opening meeting. His lectures were merely additional instruments of instructions, but always secondary in importance. He never wrote them out, but carefully prepared them, using a few notes in their delivery. We can judge of their content from the publication years later of the notebooks of several of his auditors. Moreover, Wolf always spoke in Latin, a practice which he continued later at Berlin, even though the practice there was to cost him dear. At the very beginning of the eighteenth century, Thomasius here at Halle had dared to inaugurate the habit of lecturing in German. The new custom had aroused the ridicule of the Dutch scholars who spoke of the *horribilis mugitus vernaculi sermonis* as incompatible *apud severam nationem Germanorum.* But Wolf still believed that an earnest classical student should be able to write, speak, and think in Latin. That he was a graceful and telling speaker is known from several sources. One of his Halle students, Fröhlisch (1798-1802), later wrote an account of Wolf in which he called his lectures "witty, clever, and sarcastic. Karl von Raumer heard him in 1803 and Goethe in 1805. The former, in his *Geschichte der Pädogogik* (1843-54), speaks of the "peculiar attraction of his vast learning, interest, and criticism." The latter, who during a visit at Halle prevailed upon one of Wolf's daughters to let him secrete himself behind a curtain of his lecture hall, speaks in his *Tag-und Jahreshefte* of his manner as the "spontaneous deliverance of a full mind,

a revelation issuing from a thorough knowledge, and diffusing itself over the audience with spirit, taste, and freedom."[1] His own distinguished pupil Bernhardy, the historian of Greek and Latin Literature, likened his lectures to witty conversations rather than formal teaching. And another pupil, Hanhart, speaks of the possibility of hearing a heart beat in the class room, so great was the attention of the auditors to his discourse. We are told that his pupils later on copied his mannerisms—his rapid entry into the lecture hall, his constant hemming, and his eyes riveted on his book. Only one bust, that of Lessing, ornamented his room, symbolic of his critical spirit.

During the twenty-three years of his teaching at Halle, Wolf delivered fifty different courses of lectures which ranged over the entire field of antiquity, not only the texts of authors, but all phases of ancient culture. Some of these courses were subsequently repeated up to ten times. Körte lists all the courses given at Halle between 1783 and 1806. Among Greek authors Wolf lectured on Homer's Iliad (10 times), Odyssey (3), Hymns (2), Hesiod (1), Theognis (1), Pindar (2), Aeschylus (1), Aristophanes (4), Herodotus (2), Thucydides (1), Xenophon (3), Plato (7), Aristotle (1), Aeschines and Demosthenes (4), Longinus (1), Lucian (2), Matthew and Mark (1); among Latin authors, Terence (1), Cicero (11), Horace (9), Tacitus (3), Suetonius (4), and Paterculus (1). He gave systematic courses in Mythology (3), Geography (1), Chronology (1), Numismatics (1), Painting (1), Greek and Roman Metres (1), History of Greek Literature (10), Most Ancient Greek Poetry (3), Introduction to Homer (2), Greek Tragedy (2), Greek and Roman Drama (2), Greek and Roman Literature (1), Greek Grammar (2), Latin Composition (2), Greek and Roman Antiquities (1), Greek Antiquities (7), Roman Antiquities (8), Roman Life (6), Foundations of History (1), Ancient History (7), History of Rome (1), History of Philology (1), and the *Encyclopaedia philologica* (10). He gave his lectures in cycles of three years—six semesters—lecturing on an average fourteen hours a week in the summer semester and seventeen in winter, while the ordinary ambitious Privat-dozent of his day averaged fourteen. So varied a program impresses us that we are in the presence of a great scholar and teachers. Our own classical teachers, with their hackneyed repetitions of the same courses, in which not only Latin is separated

[1] Translated by Mark Pattison, in his F. A. Wolf, *North British Review*, June, 1865, p. 37 (reprinted in Nettleship, *Essays by the Late Mark Pattison*, I, 1889).

from Greek, but subdivisions in each are parcelled out and remain permanently fixed, may read the list with profit.

One would expect few books from a scholar who carries such a schedule of work. Yet the list of Wolf's publications is neither short nor unimportant. While Winckelmann influenced the learned world only through his writings, Wolf influenced a narrower circle through the lecture-hall and seminar. In a letter to Ruhnken at Leyden he gave the key-note to his life interest by saying *docendo aliquando plus quam scribendo delector.* Years later, Niebuhr truly said that he was "before all things a teacher." Consequently, all he wrote grew out of the immediate needs of his teaching. He used to call his books *parerga,* and we are told that he wrote with difficulty, always polishing and never satisfied, driving his printer to distraction by eleventh-hour corrections. In 1783 appeared his edition of Hesiod's *Theogony;* in 1784-85 an edition of Homer; in 1786 *Selected Dialogues of Lucian;* in 1787 four Greek plays; in 1789 the *Leptines of Demosthenes,* which was to inspire his great pupil August Boeckh years later to write his *Public Economy of Athens* (1817). Even the famous *Prolegomena,* which appeared in 1795 (2nd ed. 1859, 3rd, 1872, 4th, 1875), was produced without premeditation or idea of its future fame, merely to meet an immediate need. The Francke press in Halle asked him to prepare a second edition of his school-text of Homer, 1784-5, now exhausted. As it was to contain no notes, Wolf proposed to tell in the Preface the history of the text and his method of treating it. As he had been meditating on Homer for over twenty years and had frequently lectured on the text and introduction, he merely wrote off his arguments. In this way there grew an octavo volume of 280 pages, the first part of a work whose full title was *Prolegomena ad Homerum, sive de operum Homericorum prisca et genuina forma, variisque mutationibus et probabili ratione emendandi.* The first volume gave a historical account of the accidents to the text through transmission. The proposed second volume was to give the internal proofs, the discrepancies and traces of joining in the text, in support of his contention that the Iliad especially was a conglomeration of fragments, owing its unity mainly to the alleged recension in the time of the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus. Since Wolf's fame as a scholar rests mainly upon this work, the first volume of which was completed when he was only thirty-six, we shall discuss its value somewhat at length.

Homeric scholarship in Wolf's day was practically where the Alexandrine critics had left it. In the seventeenth century scholars

had left it alone and by the middle of the eighteenth the text generally used was one reprinted from earlier Venetian and Florentine editions. Clarke in England had cleared the text of some of the more prominent errors, and Ernesti in Germany had made further progress by 1759, the Ernesti-Clarke text being thereafter commonly used in both countries. In 1788 de Villoison, after spending some time in Venice collating manuscripts and transcribing scholia, published the Venetian Scholia, though he and his immediate contemporaries were quite unconscious of the use to which these scholia might be put in revealing the difficulties which the Alexandrines had met. In the words of Professor Sandys, "the last scholar of the old school had unconsciously forged the weapons for the first scholar of the new." For whatever the merits or defects in form or theory, the appearance of the *Prolegomena* was to usher in a new epoch in the history of philology.

Though written in Latin for the learned world, the *Prolegomena* was to receive little recognition from classical scholars until the following generation, but was to be immediately read and discussed by educated men in general. While Wilhelm von Humboldt greeted it as a "great work which must take its place as a canon of editing," most of his contemporaries had anything but praise for the radical views expressed. Not a scholar in England, Holland, or France spoke in its behalf, not even Ruhnken in Leyden, to whom as *principi criticorum* Wolf had dedicated the work. De Villoison, angry at Wolf's use of his publication of the Venetian scholia, called it a "literary impiety," and the ancient historian Sainte-Croix condemned it without reading it as *un paradoxe litteraire* in 1798. France was not to feel the influence of the new theories until years afterwards through Fauriel, who was only twenty-two in 1795. In England, Peter Elmsley, also twenty-two at that time, was to show little interest in the *Prolegomena*. In his long review of Heyne's *Homeri Carmina* in eight volumes (1802), anonymously written for the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1803, he merely noted that Heyne's text alterations were mostly copied from Wolf's edition—but not a word about the *Homeric Question*. Later, in 1813, in a list of ten men who had studied the details of Greek, his own name appears, but not that of Wolf. In England the only approving voice was that of Flaxman, the sculptor. In Germany only the two Schlegels, Fichte, and, for a season, Goethe—though the latter by 1798 had returned to his faith in the unity—spoke for Wolf, while Schiller, Klopstock, Wieland, and Voss—the popular translation of Homer

by the latter had also appeared in 1795—were against him. Niebuhr, who was nineteen at the time of reappearance of the *Prolegomena*, and who was certainly influenced by Wolf's critical spirit, showed his disapproval of his Homeric views in the first volume of his *History of Rome*, 1811, by speaking of "the unity which characterizes the most perfect of Greek poems." Herder, whose prize essay on the *Origin of Language*, 1792, was to prepare the way for the rise of linguistic science, in an anonymous review of Wolf's work which, under the title of *Homer, ein Günstling der Leit*, appeared in the *Horen* for September, 1795, stated that he had long regarded Homer like Thot and Hermes, as a "constellation of lesser stars," and that his boyhood belief in the distinct authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey had been confirmed by seeing the Venetian scholia on his recent visit to Italy. Wolf, in his answer in the October number of the *Jena Literary Gazette*, asked the public to withold its judgment until the appearance of a German translation of his work—a translation that never was published. Heyne's attitude was similar to that of Herder. Wolf, in a letter dated November 18, 1795, had asked him to answer Herder, but before receiving it Heyne's review had already appeared in the *Göttingen Gelehrte Anzeigen* of November 21st, in which he called Wolf's book the "first fruits" of de Villoison's work, and added that he himself had made use of the same ideas years before in his lectures on Homer, thereby intimating that Wolf had gotten them when his student. Shortly before, however, in February, 1795, he had written Wolf that criticism was subsidiary with him, and since he and Wolf had such different aims neither stood in the way of the other. In a later number of the *Anzeigen*, December 19, 1795, he once more stated unequivocably that "he had already for thirty years entertained ideas which agreed in many respects with those contained in the *Prolegomena*." Also in a letter dated February 28, 1796, in answer to Wolf's of November 18, he complimented the latter on his researches and again wrote that it had long been a dominating thought of his that "the Iliad was a web woven from many separate pre-existing lays," and that he as well as others—for he had talked with Herder about it as far back as 1770—had held these ideas as a "matter of course." But he did not recall the essay on Homer which Wolf said he had sent him in 1779 nor did he recall the earlier implication of plagiarism. In 1797 Wolf replied to these charges by publishing in pamphlet form his *Letters to Heyne*, which had appeared in the journal *Deutschland* in 1796 and 1797.

Doubtless Heyne was hurt because his now famous pupil had dedicated his work to a German scholar living outside Germany and not to himself. But it is quite reasonable to believe the claims of both himself and Herder of having held the same views about the Homeric poems long before Wolf. It is just as reasonable also to clear Wolf of the charge of plagiarism. He had publicly stated his views since 1791, and the fact that he was not indebted for them to Heyne's lectures in his student days of 1777 was proved by the publication of the notes of Heyne's course on Homer taken by one of Wolf's fellow-students of the time. Wolf, then, cannot be said to have originated the theory of diverse authorship, for he was merely the first to launch it in a scientific manner. The ideas contained in the *Prolegomena* had been for a long time "in the air." Over two centuries before his work appeared, i. e., in 1583, Casaubon had noted the famous passage in Josephus *Contra Apionem* to the effect that writing was not known in the time of the Trojan War and that consequently the content of the poems was transmitted by memory from generation to generation until put together from separate lays in Peisistratus' day, ideas which were probably well known to the critics of Alexandria. From this passage, of which Wolf was to make so much, the French scholar had already concluded that a sound text was not to be expected. In 1713 Bentley had concluded that Homer, whom he dated around 1050 B. C., wrote a "sequel of songs" collected into the later epics in Pleisistratus' time. In 1730 the Italian Vico, though unknown to Wolf, had said that Homer was merely a collective appellation for many successive poets. Wolf had certainly seen the Michaelis translation (1773, 2nd ed., 1778) of Robert Wood's *Essay on the Original Genius of Homer*, 1769, in which the English scholar had repeated Josephus' assertion about the absence of writing in Homer's day. Thus without doubt, Wolf's theories were shared more or less by scholars of his own and preceding day. It is only a marvel that no one before him had essayed to present them in a scientific manner.

Today, the external arguments which Wolf adduced in support of his thesis of diverse authorship are no longer valid—that writing was not known in Homer's day, that the length of the poems precluded the possibility of their being publicly recited, that no occasion existed in early days for such recital, and that proofs existed of tampering with the text in the interest of Athens. The *vox totius antiquitatis* to which he so confidently appealed for the tradition of the Peisistratidean recension in the sixth century B. C., is now known

to have been late, being first noted in Cicero, and later in Pausanias, Aelian, and Josephus. It has often been remarked that Wolf, though he lived twenty-nine years after the *Prolegomena* appeared, never published the second volume nor left anything of the sort in his literary *Nachlass*. Although he projected two more editions of the Homeric text, one with a commentary in several volumes, only the one without notes, in two volumes published in 1804-07 by Göschen in Leipsic with Flaxman's illustrations, was completed, and Wolf's main interest in it is shown by his boast in the Preface that it did not contain a single printer's error—a remarkable achievement, which surpassed the edition of 1784-85 which contained only about ten errors! His interest in the *Homeric Question* seems to have ended with the *Prolegomena*. Why he never returned to so fascinating a field has never been explained satisfactorily. De Quincy thought he "had raised a ghost he could not lay," while Friedländer believed he was afraid that he might find his earlier conclusions invalid.

It was Wolf's successors, a long line of critics, who were really to supply the second part of the *Prolegomena*, to point out the differences in language and metre, religion and geography, manners and customs in the poems. His great follower Lachmann, Professor at Berlin, 1825-51, did this for the Iliad. Indeed, his *Betrachtungen über Homer's Ilias*, 1837 (reprinted 1847, 1865, 1874) was far more an epoch-making contribution than Wolf's. In it he applied to the Iliad Wolf's analysis which he already in 1816 had applied to the Niebelungen-noth. While he resolved the German epic into twenty primitive lays, which were first unified in the early thirteenth century, he dissected the Iliad, on the basis of inconsistencies and contradictions in detail, into eighteen independent lays, if not by as many minstrels. But both Wolf and Lachmann, and the latter's follower Köchly, were gradually to be supplanted by the "expanded nucleus" theory of Gottfried Hermann, 1831-32 and 1840 which, with variations may be said to be the prevailing view of the separatist school yet. On the other hand, Kirchhoff's *Die Composition der Odyssee*, 1869, in which he predicated a ninth century "Return" to which additions were constantly made, is now the basis of the view of the Odyssey held by most scholars of the Wolfian tradition today, though Wolf himself had upheld the relative "integritas" of that poem.

Wolf's greatness, then, consists rather in his critical spirit than in his results, a spirit which separated him from his contemporaries

and predecessors, though it has brought results quite different than those he anticipated. In face of the zealous advocacy of the unity of the Homeric poems which in very recent years has been resolutely away from the Wolfians, we can no longer say, as did Mark Pattison sixty years ago, that "no scholar will again find himself able to embrace the unitarian hypothesis." But the Wolfians held the stage almost alone until well on into the present century, as quotations from only two recent books will show. Thus Mrs. Wilmer Cave Wright in her *History of Greek Literature*, 1907, says: "Time which makes all heresies orthodox, has suppressed the unitarians in their turn, and all scholars are now *Chorizontes*, i. e., like the Alexandrine "Separatists" who believe in the dual authorship of the Iliad and Odyssey. Professor Breasted, in his more recent *Ancient Times*, 1916, speaks of "the ancient bards" who gave "the world its greatest epic in the Iliad." and says that the Epic cycle of poetry was "not the work of one man, but a growth of several centuries by generations of singers, some of which were still living even after 700 B. C., when they were first written down." Unfortunately, the zeal of the advocates of both schools has not been unaccompanied by expressions of mutual contempt. Thus von Wilamowitz, the present German protagonist of diverse authorship, in his *Iliad und Homer*, 1920 (2nd edition) calls the believers in unity "fanatics" and the Iliad a "miserable patchwork"; while an ardent representative of the opposing camp has expressed his contempt of the Wolfians by a wholesale condemnation of German scholarship, unfortunately not uncommon in these post-bellum days: "Wolf, Lachmann, Kirchhoff, Wilamowitz, and a long list of famous names have done much to convince the world that German erudition is blind and stupid, bent on making false facts in order to support a false theory." Such views are extreme when we must admit that if the Wolfian hypothesis is full of difficulties, no theory yet advanced has been generally accepted. We are minded to quote a wise saying of Ephorus which has its bearing on this as on many other similar questions: "If writers could only be present at the actual transactions, it would be far the best of all modes of learning."

The immediate effect of the *Prolegomena* on the fortunes of its author was to give him a call as Professor *Linguae et antiquitatis Graecae ut et rei numismaticae*, at Leyden. But an addition of three hundred thalers to his salary kept him at Halle. However, in 1779, in company with one of his daughters, Wolf visited Ruhnken, and was amazed to find that the latter, reputed the foremost classical

scholar of the continent, could not lecture nor speak in Latin, and had to converse in French or Dutch. In 1798 Wolf received another call, this time to Copenhagen as Director of Secondary Education in Denmark, which ultimately also fell through. Three years later he published his edition of the four orations *post reditum* of Cicero, and in 1802 his *Suetonius,* the only evidence of his literary activity in the latter years of his stay at Halle.

Wolf had no intimation that his work at Halle was soon to be cut short. In August of 1806 Prussia declared war on Napoleon, and three days after the battle of Jena, October 14, 1806, French troops entered the ancient city on the Saale. Though free of personal danger, Wolf was involved in the fate of the university, for on the 20th October, it was closed by order of the French commandant, and the students were sent home under French passports. The battle of Jena, then, as Karl von Raumer said, was the "fateful turning-point" of Wolf's life. He immediately wrote to Goethe his plight and was advised to spend what Wolf liked to call his *otia gallica* in revising for publication his survey of classical culture, the *Encyclopaedia philologica.* This revision, entitled *Darstellung der Alterthums-Wissenschaft* was published as the leading article in the first number of the *Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft,* a literary journal founded in 1807 by Wolf and his pupil Buttmann. In the spring of 1807, on the advice of von Humboldt, he moved to Berlin, destined never again to see Halle, even though later invited to resume his work there. But Halle was thenceforth to belong to Napoleon's new kingdom of Westphalia and Wolf would not return. The next seventeen years of his life were to be spent in Berlin, where he arrived April 2nd, 1807, twenty-four years almost to a day after his arrival in Halle.

It was at this time that plans were maturing for founding the University of Berlin. Wolf himself, soon after his arrival, had written the minister von Beyme about the need of replacing the university of Halle, now lost to Prussia, by a new "General Teaching Institute" at Berlin connected with the old Academy of Sciences. In his reply of September 5th, 1807, the minister expressed his pleasure with Wolf's suggestion, but said that he himself had long entertained the same idea. He also expressed the hope that Wolf might find a position in the new institution similar to the one he had held at Halle. In fact by September 4th the cabinet order for such a school had been signed by the king, out of which three years later was to grow the University of Berlin. Everyone imagined that

Wolf, now in the prime of his life and fame, would find a prominent place in the circle of scholars to be gathered from all Germany to form the new faculty. But Wolf, as we shall see, was to play quite a different role in the new institution, though he was able to place in it his two ablest scholars, Boeckh as Professor of Eloquence and Classical Literature in 1811, and Bekker as Professor of Poetry in 1812.

In September, 1807, Wolf received a call as Professor of Latin and Archaeology at Charkow. Soon after he received a pension from the King of eight hundred thalers in consequence of which in October of that year he was appointed *Visitator* to the Joachimsthal Gymnasium. At about the same time he was enrolled as foreign member of the Munich Academy of Sciences, and in December of the following year he was called as Librarian and Professor of Literature and Antiquities at Landshut. His refusal of the latter made it clear that he wished to remain in Berlin. During 1809-1810 his old friend von Humboldt became President of the Education Section of the Prussian Department of the Interior at Königsberg. In February, 1809, Wolf asked that he appoint him to any position that was agreeable to the King and suitable to his abilities, since he wished to do all he could for the Academy and the new university, but "without belonging to the actual body" of the latter. This meant that he would like to lecture at his pleasure, but be relieved from the ordinary professorial duties. Von Humboldt, sensing that his secret ambition was to be something more than a professor, in February, 1910, got a place created for him as Director of the Scientific Deputation of the Department of Public Instruction for the term of one year, and at the same time a seat on the board of public instruction of which he himself was President, with duties of general oversight over all scientific work in Prussia, including the inspection of gymnasia and especially the one at Joachimsthal. But it was soon clear that Wolf was not satisfied with his new duties, and that he coveted becoming *Staatsrath* in connection with general education. Von Humboldt tried to convince him that his title of Director outranked that of *Staatsrath*, and that his seat on the board made him the equal of the latter, minus its duties and red-tape. Wolf, therefore, took his seat along with Schleiermacher, Bernhardi, Erman, and others, but soon showed that he possessed neither the tact nor patience to work with them, and by March resigned on the plea of ill-health, reserving the status of an "extraordinary" member only. Schleiermacher replaced him as Director, and the board

invited him to found a Philological Seminary in the new university similar to the one at Halle. Wolf gradually withdrew from all active co-operation with the board and the inspection of gymnasia, though his work on the latter was to prove invaluable.

In the late summer of 1810, Wolf visited Vienna and Munich. While in the former city he received word from the Ministry of Public Instruction that lectures would begin at the opening of the university in the middle of October, and that he should state at once what courses he wished to give and in what capacity. Wolf answered that he still believed, as he had earlier expressed himself in letters to von Beyme and von Humboldt, that members of the Academy as well as professors should have the privilege of lecturing. He also asked a delay of two weeks before he should return to Berlin. A second note warned him to begin his work at the time announced and that certain lectures had already been assigned to him. In the meantime his staunch supporter von Humboldt had been delegated to go to Vienna as Ambassador, and Wolf had to fend for himself. He was finally, therefore, taken at his word and began to lecture at the university from his seat in the Academy and was given a salary of nine hundred thalers. As time went on, he found his new position anything but agreeable. He could lecture only at unfavorable hours when the regular professors were not busy. He also found that his lectures were badly attended, as he sometimes had only one regular student. Bad health made him irregular and so narrowed his circle of students, but his insistence on using Latin in face of the now general custom of using German narrowed it more. The fact that Boeckh, formerly his pupil, but now his colleague, had many students naturally made him resentful. Moreover, a change was being gradually wrought in the very nature of the man, due to disappointment, ill-health, petty annoyances, and many other causes, and this was to rob his lectures of the old Halle charm. Everyone remarked the change, colleagues and students, the latter wittily explaining it by saying that "the Halle Wolf was being devoured by the Berlin wolf."

In short, the story of Wolf's life at Berlin is a sad one, very different from that of the happy days at Halle. Wounded pride and bitterness gradually oppressed him. It had been better for his fame and comfort if his career as scholar and teacher had ended at Halle, for in Berlin he added nothing or little to either. It is difficult to analyze just what was the matter that he could not "find" himself in his new surroundings, as he had in the old. In Halle he had felt

himself *facile princeps*, and could feel and show a quiet contempt for his colleagues. He doubtless expected to fill a similar place in the larger city, but on finding he was only one among equals, his old vanity made him disappointed, fractious, and embittered. Wolf had always been a petty tyrant in his domestic circle, behavior which had necessitated a separation from his wife in 1802. Thereafter for many years he had lived with his second daughter until her marriage to Koerte, who tells us in his biography that Wolf's friends approved of the divorce. During the last ten years of his life he lived with one servant, who had a difficult time managing his exacting and irascible master. His nature, which had displayed its idiosyncrasies at Halle for the most part in the more intimate relations of the home life was to show itself in the wider ones of public life at Berlin. He, of course, ascribed the ill-feeling which his bearing excited on all sides to envy, and was fond of quoting Themistocles that "he who is not envied, has done nothing." Goethe remarked the change in his friend's nature during a visit of the latter to Weimar in 1816. In a letter to a friend he says that Wolf "not only contradicts everything one says, but denies everything that exists," and further speaks of the "preposterous temper which makes his society intolerable," and adds that his ways are contagious, even making Goethe himself say "just the opposite of what he thought."

Under such changed conditions Wolf's work suffered greatly. Between 1810 and 1823 he offered only five new lecture courses. During the last years he advertised two courses a term, but delivered only one. We might expect that he would have turned to literary work as a solace during these embittered years. But in the entire seventeen years at Berlin his output was small and not very good if compared with his work at Halle. We have already mentioned the publication of the *Darstellung* in the *Museum der Altherthumswissenschaft*, which he founded along with others in 1807, and dedicated to Goethe. But this was merely the fruit of his oft-repeated lectures at Halle on the *Encyclopaedia philologica*. Soon after he quarreled with his pupil and co-editor Buttmann and resigned, so that the journal continued only to 1811. In that year he brought out a critical text and translation of the *Clouds*, and a text of the *Phaedo*. In 1812 he published a minor work, *Geographica Graeca*, and, with Bekker's collaboration, the text of the *Enthyphro, Apology, and Crito*, and in 1813 he produced the first satire of Horace in Latin and German along with the scholia. The Plato of 1812 just mentioned was not a labor of love, but of spite against a former

pupil. Years before in Halle, Wolf had invited an enthusiastic pupil, Heindorf, to join him in an edition of Plato's works. As no progress was made, Heindorf had gone to work by himself and in 1802 had produced the first of four volumes which included twelve dialogues, the entire work being finished in 1910 and dedicated to his former master. In the preface of the 1912 edition, dedicated to von Humboldt, Wolf advertised with Bekker to edit Plato's *opera omnia Graece et Latine*, with critical apparatus, notes, and a philosophic commentary in special volumes, one of which was to be devoted to Plato's life, work, and teaching, the whole to be completed in seven to ten years. In this way he showed his contempt of Heindorf's completed work. In 1816 appeared the first volume of his last considerable work, the *Analecta*, to be completed in 1820. In its preface he referred to Heindorf by name in most ungenerous terms to the effect that at the time of the invitation extended to the latter in Halle he had regarded him as "fitted merely to be a subordinate collaborator, perhaps for the taking of exact excerpts and variants, or for the preparation of a good index," and spoke contemptuously of his "meekly subservient followers." Such expressions and especially the last, which were so out of place in a scientific work, had a most unexpected result. Buttmann, with the help of several of his friends—Schleiermacher, Niebuhr, Savigny, J. G. Schneider, and even Wolf's favorite pupil Boeckh—wrote a scathing protest on behalf of the injured Heindorf who was now in an advanced state of disease, dying two months later in Halle whither he had been called from Breslau as professor. In it they said that in critical ability Heindorf far outdistanced his former master and that they recognized "the fearful symptoms of an approaching literary bankruptcy" in Wolf, who after all was merely a Dozent at the university with a corresponding salary! Wolf pretended not to read the protest, and, in Schleiermacher's words, became more than ever "the distinguished hermit." Wolf's revenge on Schleiermacher who, when professor and university preacher at Halle, had come under his influence almost as a pupil, was relentless. He printed one sentence from his own text of the Phaedo along with the latter's German translation of it—Schleiermacher had translated most of Plato between 1804 and 1810—and marked the errors in the German by italics, thus showing there were almost as many mistakes as words. At about the time of the Buttmann protest another appeared written by Voss, father and son, entitled, *F. A. Wolf, der Metriker*, in which the two went even further in denouncing Wolf, maintain-

ing that Heindorf far outshone his teacher in scientific attainments and grammar, and challenging Wolf to declare himself further about the *Homeric Question*—an allusion to Wolf's promised second volume of the *Prolegomena*.

Wolf's health now gradually failed. In 1819 and 1820 he received his last public honors, in 1819 being elected as foreign member of the French *Academie des Inscriptions et belles lettres*, to which his name had been proposed before in 1811 but rejected on the ground that he had "doubted the existence of Homer," in 1820 as foreign member of the Academy of Herculanean Antiquities at Naples, and in the same year, through Goethe's influence, as foreign honorary member of the Society of Mineralogy at Jena. It was also in 1820 that his last work was published, the *Apologia Socratis* for gymnasium use, which was cut from the edition of 1812.

We now come to the closing scene of Wolf's unhappy life, for death was to be the only solution of his difficulties. During his entire stay at Berlin his health had been indifferent. He had made several journeys for his health, in 1814 to Wiesbaden, in 1815 to the Baltic, in 1816 to his old home in Hainrode and Nordhausen, to Osterrode, Göttingen, and Weimar, in 1818 to the North Sea, and in 1820 a more extended one to Switzerland to see his old pupils there. In January of 1922 he had been very ill, and in fact never regained his health. He celebrated his sixty-fifth birthday in 1824 with the presentiment it would be his last. As the spring came on his health grew worse, and he was finally induced to follow his physician's advice to visit the Riviera and the baths at Nice. He asked for a year's leave of absence from the university on full pay, but was told he must follow the usual custom of taking a sabbatical year on half salary, which meant he could not go at all. He immediately wrote to the King, pointing out that his proposed absence from duty was not for pleasure, but to save his life. So certain was he of a favorable answer that he left Berlin on April 4th before it came, both the answer and his passport overtaking him in Frankfurt. He journeyed slowly south by Weimar, where Goethe tried to dissuade him from so long a journey, to Strassburg, Lyons, and St. Peray, remaining a week at the latter place as a guest on the estate of the Faure family. From Montpellier he made an excursion to Cette where he saw the Mediterranean for the first time. He reached Marseilles on July 16, having been nearly three and a half months on the way. He was fated to go no further. Because of the unaccustomed heat he became imprudent in his diet, and soon

cholera morbus and other complications developed. For a time he grew better, but a recurrence of the same symptoms in a severer form ended in his death on the evening of August 8, with only his physician present. Wolf's fortitude at the end so impressed the latter that he wrote to a friend in Weimar that "he was happy to have seen a scholar die with such dignity," and expressed the hope he might die similarly.

Just twenty-four hours after his death, Wolf was laid to rest in the city churchyard in the classic soil of Massilia. Years later, in 1852, his daughter made every effort to locate the grave, but further than that it was one of three in a certain corner of the graveyard, it could not be identified. So the idea of setting up a fitting monument at the grave was given up, only a Latin epitaph marking its approximate site. Instead, a marble bust of Wolf, copied by Heidel from one by Tieck, was placed in the Aula of the University of Halle, where he had enjoyed his greatest success, by the association of German philologists. His unknown tomb once more illustrates the words of Pericles that

*Ἀνδρῶν ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος.*

# BIAS, INCONSISTENCY AND HERMENEUTICS

BY ANTONIO LLANO

## I

MUCH of the trouble in the world is caused by bias and inconsistency. Bias is a compelling psychological force which, regardless of facts and logic, imposes on the mind certain beliefs beforehand, and afterwards prompts the understanding to justify them, often blinding it to actual facts and cogent arguments, and deceiving it into taking fallacious reasoning for sound reasoning. It may be a present state of mind, or the result of a previous state of mind long forgotten, or even the effect of past impressions made on the organism without producing consciousness at the time. Perhaps, too, some forms of bias are due to heredity, especially those relating to beliefs and opinions that began to develop in the early periods of human evolution. Moral and religious feelings belong to this last class.

Inconsistency is the lack of congruity or harmony between a man's avowed beliefs and his acts, or among the beliefs themselves. When insincere, it is hypocrisy. When sincere, it is usually the unavoidable effect of some overmastering bias.

Generally, the mind acquires knowledge in an incomplete and disconnected way, and forms judgments which, arising independently of one another, may be mutually contradictory, or inconsistent. The inconsistency, however, is found only later, when comparison and attempts at unification begin; but then some of the judgments already formed may have become beliefs too deeply rooted to be immediately displaced by their opposites. If we conceive such mental states to have as their physical basis certain brain arrangements, it will be readily understood that, the more stably these arrangements have become organized, the harder will be the work of altering them, and the longer it will take to effect the change. It is as

if each belief occupied in the brain what Maudsley calls an independent mental area, which it stubbornly refused to surrender. The conflicting beliefs will long continue to coexist side by side, while the mind, unaware of the cause of its duplicity, and loath to acknowledge its lack of unity, will resort to the most flagrant fallacies to convince itself that there is no conflict.

Another source of bias and inconsistency is premature generalization arising from incomplete knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that throughout his life a man already advanced in years has neither known nor heard of a hornless cow. He will no doubt acquire the firm belief that horns are an inseparable part of a cow's anatomy, and, with that natural tendency of man to claim absolute certainty in all matters, will declare a hornless cow to be an impossibility. If later he hears of cows without horns, he will deny their existence. If he sees them, he will try to prove that their horns were cut off, or have not yet grown, or perhaps that the animals in question are not cows at all. He may even go to the end of his life arguing the case, and perhaps his successors, taught from childhood that all cows have horns, will continue the process of refutation and "interpretation." It may be several generations before the plain fact is acknowledged that some cows have no horns. To some this may sound like a fanciful case, but to those acquainted with political, theological and ethical controversies, and with the psychology of mental habits, it will sound familiar. Many a discovery of astronomy, geology and biology has proved a hornless cow, and many a preserver of the old order is still looking for the horns. To this subject I shall rever in subsequent paragraphs.

There is a pernicious and uncharitable tendency to identify inconsistency with hypocrisy, especially in judging leading men engaged in the solution of transcendent problems affecting the destiny of human kind. A philosopher would judge more generously as well as more justly and truly, and ascribe that inconsistency to unconscious bias and to the existence of rival mental areas in the same individual, involuntarily and independently formed, and not susceptible of sudden elimination. As saintliness has not yet become uiversal, it is not unlikely that some of the great leaders of the world are knaves; but it is as unlikely that they all are that name. Yet, it seems obvious that the majority of them are victims of inconsistency. I say *victims*, not *guilty*, of inconsistency, as I refer only to those that do not see this weakness in their conduct and doctrines, or seeing it, think it only a superficial semblance,

which they waste much time in barren exertions to remove. When Augustus and Tiberius praised and feigned to submit to the authority of the Roman senate and people, and hid their usurpation under the forms that had meant freedom before freedom died with Brutus at Phillipi, they were guilty of inconsistency—they were hypocrites. When Galileo held that the earth revolves about the sun, and yet adhered to the literal interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures, he was a victim of inconsistency—an honest man with two mutually conflicting mental areas.

There is hardly an opinion which does not arise from bias, conscious or unconscious, and which does not contradict other opinions which the same person claims to hold, and honestly thinks he holds. As a rule, beliefs are rather emotional or accidental than intellectual; rather the result of education and environment, of casual impressions and associations, than the product of impartial, deliberating reason, freely weighing evidence and baring the truth. In many cases, they are but survivals, reduced perhaps to remnants by the attacks of rival beliefs, of the childish notions and superstitions of prehistoric man. It is often argued that the antiquity of a belief proves that that belief is well founded, either in facts or in the nature of man. This mode of reasoning seems to be bad logic, bad history and bad psychology; for nearly all the conceptions of the ancients with regard to the world, man included, were misconceptions. Rather should we say that the older a belief is, the more we should suspect it and put it to the test of present standards.

Reason often struggles to assert herself, and cherishes the illusion that she is exercising her noble and lofty rights, when in reality she is led by hidden guides along devious channels where she sees only what they have prepared for her to see. The Mussulman or the Buddhist scholar is prepared to prove by an appeal to reason, as he thinks, that his faith is superior to the Christian faith, while the Christian scholar is equally certain that reason can establish the superiority of Christianity to all other religions. Why? Mainly, and probably only, because each sucked his religion with his mother's milk, and found it already established in his mind as a necessary truth when he began to think. If his mother had been nursed with the milk of India, he would have been ready to prove that Brahmanism is the only rational religion, and the eternal Vedas the only source of truth.

The same thing happens in politics, economics, ethics and many other departments of thought relating not only to great things, but

to small things as well, down to very trifles. Circumstances of one kind or another, in which the intellect has no part, open the road that reason must follow, and she obediently and slavishly moves in it, although, unaware of the forces that impel and drag her, she thinks herself free. It is true that now and then a man will shake off the yoke of custom, education and tradition, leave the atmosphere on which he has fed and in which he has lived, and, apparently guided by liberated and unfettered reason, explore the field of facts and thought, assume an independent attitude, and freely adopt what his unbiased understanding can unconditionally support. It is pious to believe, or at least to hope, that in many of these cases there is a real intellectual emancipation. Nevertheless, experience compels the admission that perhaps in the majority of cases the elimination of bias is but apparent, the actual process consisting in the triumph of one form of bias over another, so that it is rather a process of substitution than one of elimination. The most devoted Catholic may become a sincere deist or an atheist because some priest hurt his feelings, creating in him first a dislike for that priest, then for other priests, and gradually for the Catholic religion and for religion generally. The change may have taken place so slowly that he may not even remember its origin. He will proclaim, and honestly believe, that unhampered reason opened his eyes and let in the light of truth, when, as an actual fact, the whole revolution in his thought was the unconscious effect of some trivial offence. Had Plato and Aristotle, when they were born, been taken to Judea and brought up in the synagogue, they might have been two of the prophets, and the intellectual development of Europe might have been radically different from what it was. People might have thought differently, felt differently, reasoned differently, and yet with equal conviction and certainty. And why? Simply because two Greek babes had been taken to the land of Jewry.

Two morals follow from these obvious facts, the one discouraging and discomforting, the other soothing and purifying. The first is that most all our opinions and beliefs with regard to debatable philosophical matters and matters affecting the mutual relations of men are the effect of fortuitous causes, often unintellectual and exceedingly trivial. They are automatic adaptations or responses of the mental organism to its medium, and are defended by individual reason only because reason finds them there and is prevented from functioning otherwise than as a tool of the obstinate, enduring feelings arising from such causes and organized in the nervous centers

as masters that unconsciously dictate all the operations of the intellect. They make the intellect itself stubborn, or, acting like the blinkers on a draft animal, prescribe its path and the range of its vision.

What, then, are in these matters those cherished and boasted things we call conviction and certainty? Very suspicious things indeed, since they are likely to be aliens in the realm of reason exercising their rights under spurious papers of citizenship. Nor will this sad conclusion seem at all surprising to any serious-minded person who will ask himself whether he really feels certainty or true conviction about the views he holds on politics, ethics, economics or theology. How many Republicans or Democrats, Socialists or Capitalists, Christians or Jews can answer ten per cent of the arguments of their opponents? If they are fond of disputation and have often engaged in it, they know that many a time they have been silenced, or, confused and helpless, resorted to meaningless, irrelevant or even contradictory answers and explanations that neither answer nor explain and are evidence at once of defeat and of unwillingness to acknowledge it; and perhaps they have ended the debate with the common declaration of stubborn impotence, "That may be, but I don't think so." This declaration tells the sad story, although it is not properly phrased. As there is really very little *thinking* about the matter, but feeling, blind feeling or belief begotten without the co-operation of reason, the actual state of mind is more fittingly described by the statement, "That may be, but I don't *feel* so, don't *wish* to believe it, and *won't* believe it." Such stubborness occurs even among mathematicans, where one would least expect it. When non-Euclidean geometry was first formulated, many old geometers and philosophers sneered at it and undertook to refute it. Its reasoning was unanswerable, and their arguments were fallacious or mere anathemas; but their hardened faith made them *feel* that "there must be something wrong somewhere."

The second moral to be derived from the psychological facts here described is of more positive value, philosophically as well as ethically, than the first. From a purely philosophical point of view, those facts teach that there is a danger against which reason should constantly be on guard. The danger is all the greater because it is often hidden in the depths of subconsciousness. Honest reason should always endeavor to discover it, if possible, and sail clear of it, also *if possible*. And herein lies the rub; for, given the constitution of the human mind, and the controlling influence of long-estab-

lished feelings, is it actually possible for the intellect to overrule them? Probaby not entirely, or not always. However, much will be gained by endeavoring to shake off their tyranny and attain at least in part that ideal desideratum we call impartiality, without which the continuous thread of logic cannot be followed. Reason will take a long step forward if, as in Kant's memorable analysis, she learns at least her limitations, and realizes that she is tied by many strings, some stretching back to the caves of primitive man. Conservatism should be practiced with caution and rather with distrust, and radicalism not hastily condemned. Although iconoclasm often breaks more than false idols, the presumption is that when it arises there are false idols that have lived too long.

The ethical teaching of the law of unconscious bias is humility and tolerance. The philosopher knows that truth is elusive and seldom emerges out of the mist of uncertainty; that the mental powers are exceedingly weak and limited, and that their findings are for the most part guesses of things that seem probable, not of things that are facts. He also knows that reason is seldom a free agent, but nearly always is fatally led by contingent circumstances along paths which, had not those circumstances ever existed, she never would have followed. He knows that perhaps, and very likely, the true and only cause of his thinking that Mr. Wilson's policies are defensible on rational or humanitarian grounds is neither rationality nor humanitarianism, but simply that he, the philosopher, was brought up in a Democratic family, and learned to *feel* like a Democrat before he learned to reason. He knows that perhaps, and very likely, the true and only cause of his opponents' holding that Mr. Wilson's policies can be condemned on rational or humanitarian grounds is that his opponents grew in a Republican atmosphere, and were Republicans first, and thinkers afterwards, if at all. He knows that perhaps, and very likely, the true and only cause of his holding certain views on religion, politics and ethics is that his progenitors of many ages ago believed in ghosts and fetishes, in social and political slavery, in the sacredness of custom, and in the special rights of privileged classes. He knows that he is but emerging from the night of the past, and beginning dimly to discern the true form of the objects which in the darkness assumed fanciful shapes, not yet vanished. In brief, he knows that he knows very little, and that little with very little certainty.

Knowing this, the philosopher, that is, the true and honest thinker, will regulate his attitude accordingly. He will be neither

dogmatic and arrogant about his own opinions, nor intolerant, unforbearing and contemptuous about the opinions of others. There is always the possibility, and even the probability, that his own reason may be but the instrument of pre-existing blind feelings, and his own "convictions" but another name for those feelings; and that, if those feelings had not shaped his reasoning apparatus, his "convictions" would have been different. As to this opponents, they, too, may owe their opinions to similar causes, and the fact that they are not convinced by his arguments is not always proof that they are either dishonest or intellectually inferior. He may hold and defend his faith, and hope that it is the true faith; but the obvious fact that intellects which in other matters are as good as his, or better, hold opposite views will make him pause and ask himself whether he is really justified in categorically proclaiming that he sees with absolute distinctness things which they, with eyes perhaps as keen, are unable to see.

## II

One of the strangest effects of some forms of bias is an inconsistency which seems unthinkable and would be unbelievable, were it not so common. Usually bias is consistently intolerant. It leads the minds to hold certain views, prevents it from seeing anything subversive of them, and quickens it to see, or to believe it sees, many things that support them. But in the queer form I now purpose to deal with, the same person affirms a general proposition and denies particular propositions logically subsumed under it, apparently holding mutually contradictory beliefs. The inconsistency arises from a bias that does not allow him to see the subsumption and prompts him to gross fallacies by which himself would be disgusted or amused, were it not that he does not, and *will not*, see them as fallacies. After having acknowledged that A is black, he will, in special circumstances in which the blackness of A does not fit in with some previous feeling or conception, which is the biasing influence, endeavor to convince himself and others that what really is A is something else.

This natural yet regrettable aberration is most wasteful of energy and time, and a very heavy drag on progress. A man or a party, a government or a church, may sincerely adopt, defend and preach the general proposition, "Whenever A exists, the necessary conse-

quence is B." The proposition may even belong to the class of those universally recognized as axiomatic, fundamental and absolute. And yet, if in any particular instance in which A exists, the consequence B happens to imply as a further consequence the surrender of an oil well or a gold mine, the enactment of an unwelcome law, the disavowal of the sacredness of a revered book, or the abandonment of a time-honored article of faith, logic vanishes from the mind at once. Reason succumbs under the attacks of interest or feeling, which deceives the intellect, dragging it into a maze of fallacies that it honestly mistakes for cogent arguments, all tending to prove that in that particular instance A does not exist.

Ethics, theology and politics afford numberless illustrations of this mental failing, from which even the exact sciences suffer not infrequently. Many examples may be found in the recent dealings growing out of the World War; dealings in which principle after principle, held to be based on reason and justice, is violated in the name of reason and justice, while the violators honestly believe that they are right both in upholding and inviolating it, simply because their strong bias makes them see distortions seeming to prevent things that do fit together from fitting together. They lack the courage of their convictions, and their lack of courage, which in these cases is the disturbing bias, has suggested the evasions and quibbling by which they have so long impeded the restoration of peace. Having predetermined that certain pegs will not go into certain round holes, they see the pegs square and too large, although the pegs are of the exact form and dimensions to fit the holes perfectly. As, however, this is a slippery field just now, where all sides are groping in the darkness of emotion, believing it to be the light of reason, I shall abstain from dwelling on, or even mentioning, any specific cases of the prevailing disease.

The subject of the arbitration of international difficulties, considered in all its generality, may perhaps be introduced here without particularly hurting the feelings of either the Trojans or the Greeks. The proposition is admitted as self-evident that a man may not be a judge in his own case, and that he may not exercise as a right any line of conduct that others claim to be in violation of their rights, unless a competent tribunal hears the case and decides in his favor. This principle is fundamental; it forms the root of all law; it is recognized as an obvious dictate of justice, approved by both reason and expediency, and no one disputes it. It may be thus formulated in all its generality: "X is not a competent judge in his

own case, against Y, nor Y against X, whoever X and Y may be." The principle is founded on the psychological law of bias; the law, that is, that judgment is influenced by interest; and as that law has no real exceptions, although it has some apparent, the principle is absolute and therefore of universal applicability, both to individuals and to collective bodies. It carries with it the principle of arbitration as an immediate corollary, which, like the general principle itself, has no exceptions. In the case of individuals, there is no hesitation in applying the corollary; no one claims that he surrenders his legitimate rights by submitting to it, nor does any one attempt the subterfuge of distinguishing between the justiciable and the non-justiciable; for X is no more competent to decide whether his case is justiciable or not than he is to decide whether he or Y is right, when their claims clash.

But when X or Y is a powerful nation (the weak nations seldom indulge in such juggling, having nothing to gain thereby), the attitude of many is quite another. They do not deny the general principle, but endeavor to convince themselves and others that nations cannot be substituted for X and Y in the formula, except in certain circumstances. Although they speak of nations, they really have in mind only their own nation, and although they speak of "special circumstances" in general, they really have in mind only the circumstances that may affect that nation. This is not the place to enter into such fallacies, some of which are really ingenious and all the more effective as they appeal to popular prejudices and emotions, by which, indeed, they are begotten. It is sufficient to point out their inconsistency with a proposition that underlies all law; a proposition the acceptance of which is the main safeguard of justice, and the denial of which is an implicit expression of a desire to subordinate justice to selfish interest. No person, no group, no nation that in any case whatsoever says, "I am the law" can consistently defend the imposition of any law by the community on the individual.

## III

Theology is perhaps the most powerful spring and the most prolific source of inconsistency. It has always been so, from the earliest times to the present, and in the least as well as in the most enlightened revealed religions. The evolution of religion, and therefore of theology in its broadest sense, has been for the most part a process of elimination and purification. During the historic period of mankind, the process, becoming conscious of itself, has led to much discussion and created much bitter bigotry, formerly acted, but now felt or spoken only.

It is in these discussions, seldom unbiased, that inconsistency makes itself manifest to the impartial student. Its cause lies in the conflict between old conceptions which, having lasted and acted through many generations, have developed habitual *feelings*, and new conceptions, with which those feelings are logically though not psychologically incongruous. This antagonism is what elsewhere I have ventured to call the law of conflict between new judgments and old feelings; a law which states the seemingly strange phenomenon that when a judgment has persisted so long as to produce a deep-rooted feeling, the feeling continues to assert itself long after the judgment has been found to be false and given place to an opposite judgment, which might be expected to create an opposite feeling. One does not realize that the old feeling is the effect of the old judgment, or belief, and as one continues long to experience it, one makes strenuous though fruitless efforts to reconcile it with one's new belief. The efforts, which really are nothing but fallacies unconsciously fabricated by bias, become weaker and weaker, as the old feelings yield more and more to the pressure of the new judgments. It is thus that faiths die. They live as gradually vanishing emotional forms long after their rational grounds have been undermined and entirely destroyed, and die only when the new judgments have developed new mental habits.

A certain book, be it Chinese or Hindu, Hebrew or Arabian, appears at a time when the people for whom it is intended are still in their intellectual infancy. It claims, or its authors claim for it, supernatural origin and divine authority, and, owing to the primitive state of society at the time, is accepted without question as an infallible oracle and code. It is held as something sacred, venerated

with a feeling of awe that precludes, as the highest sacrilege, any doubt as to its origin or any inquiry into the true value of its contents. Nor are these feelings independent of prevailing judgments; for the marvelous narratives of the book, its ethical, historical and philosophical crudities are in keeping with the conceptions of undeveloped minds, so that what it does is to give divine sanction to current beliefs, thereby perpetuating them. If it contains something new in its details, that something harmonizes with those beliefs, and is readily accepted with submissive and undoubting devotion and credulity. This feeling of reverence for the book is transmitted from generation to generation; tradition, custom and education, and perhaps physiological heredity, contribute to convert it as it were, into an integral part of the mental make-up of those born and brought up under its sway; it seems to become organized in the nervous centers as the instinctive recognition of an axiom, as something *given*, to be taken as a matter of course. The conditions under which the book originated may have disappeared and be unknown or forgotten; the present judgments and opinions may no longer be those that gave rise to it and are unequivocally expressed in it; but the feeling—the blind feeling—persists that the book is sacred and infallible. The original judgments with which the feeling harmonized and from which the feeling grew may be dead, and yet the feeling continues to assert itself, just as a nervous woman's fear of a pistol continues after she learns that the pistol is unloaded.

It is in these psychological facts that the curious and apparently anomalous process of theological exegesis, or "interpretation," in the usual sense of the term, had its origin, and it is from them that it derives its vitality. At first, the feeling of reverence is too deep, and man shrinks even from the idea of examining the book in the light of reason, as from a sacrilegious attempt to pry into the infinite mind of the Deity. Later, he timidly approaches it with the predetermination to harmonize its contents, still assumed beforehand to be of divine origin, with reason and profane knowledge. In this stage, interpretation is mainly unconscious perversion, and consists in inventing more or less far-fetched, more or less puerile subterfuges whereby both the spirit and the letter of the book are misread, that is, misinterpreted, whenever they do not agree with new conceptions. Still later, perversion gives place to partial elimination. Such parts of the book as do not conform to new ideas are discarded as extraneous elements, introduced either by meddlers or by the original

writers in uninspired moments; or such parts are explained away in some other manner and declared unimportant, while the rest of the book is still considered as divinely inspired. In the next stage, the whole book is declared to be entirely of human origin, but is still held in reverence on account of its moral teachings and of the supernatural or sacred character attached to the beings from which those teachings ultimately emanate. It is not necessary to carry the process of interpretation and criticism any farther, but a concrete illustration of it may prove interesting and helpful. For this purpose, I have chosen a case which is both extreme and typical.

In the seventeenth century lived Benedict Spinoza, the father of modern pantheism and determinism, and one of the noblest and lovable figures in the history of thought. "His life," says Heine with some exaggeration but not quite without reason, "was a copy of the life of his kinsman Jesus Christ." He elaborated a system of philosophy at once awful and comforting, stern and benign, which, later revived, modified and impulsed by Hegel and other German philosophers, is perhaps, in its substance, the prevailing system among the advanced thinkers of today. "If you would be a philosopher," says Hegel, "you must begin by becoming a Spinozist." "There is no possible view of life but Spinoza's," declares Lessing. Goethe, in his moments of weariness and despondency, sought a refuge in the works of the humble Jew, and one of his friends complained that no one could persuade the poet to read anything but Spinoza's *Ethics*. This book stirred the intellectual world as only the works of Kant and of Darwin have stirred it since, and left as deep and lasting an impression on succeeding generations. I mention these details to show the caliber of the man, which makes his inconsistency all the more striking as an illustration of the overmastering subjugation of reason by traditional feeling, and the solicitude of reason to defend that subjugation as an act of free confirmation and acceptance on her part.

In the philosophy of Spinoza, as set forth in his *Ethics*, God is the eternal "substance" of which nature, including man, is an infinite series of changing aspects, or "modes," succeeding one another inexorably, according to invariable laws. Everything, whether physical or mental, occurs necessarily and unavoidably, by virtue of eternal properties and attributes; and not one jot of what exists or has existed could possibly have been different from what it is or has been, without annihilating the whole of nature and therefore God himself. "The things that have been produced by God cannot

have been produced in any other manner nor in any other order," says Spinoza. When we say that God creates, produces or makes different things, we mean that he manifests himself in different ways, or, rather, that he necessarily and automatically passes through, or becomes, different "modes" in his eternal activity. But this activity is a succession not of voluntary acts but of necessary states. "God does not act by virtue of a free will," asserts the philosopher. In reality, Spinoza's God does not *act;* he *functions.* Although he possesses the attribute of thought, it is a sort of abstract thought, something vague, formless and indefinite that appears as real mind, with ideas, volitions, emotions and mental processes only in man and other conscious creatures. These states, considered as concrete mental states, do not exist in God. "Neither intelligence nor will belong to the nature of God," is Spinoza's explicit statement. Nothing is done with any purpose or for the realization of any plan, but whatever is, is because it must be. "Nature" (that is, God) "does not aim at any end in its operations, and final causes are nothing but pure fictions imagined by men."

Human acts and thoughts, being but God's modes, are manifestations of His activity. In this sense they may be called his works, or parts of him. They are phenomena necessarily arising from his eternal nature. Man is no more free to act as he does in any circumstances than an unsupported stone is free to obey or not to obey the force of gravity, and a scoundrel is no more responsible for being a scoundrel than a horse for being a horse. Sin and virtue, good and evil, order and disorder are only names of certain relations between man and things. To God such terms are unmeaning; or, rather, they are unmeaning when considered as descriptions of God's works. God is offended at nothing, approves nothing, reproves nothing, in the usual acceptation of these terms. He has neither intelligence, will, passions nor emotions, and in him is neither joy nor sorrow, neither love nor hatred. "Properly speaking," says Spinoza, "God neither loves nor hates anybody." So necessary a part of God is this indifference, that without it God could not be. "He who loves God," adds the philosopher, "cannot make any effort that God love him in return," for this would be to wish that God were not God.

He winds up the first part of his *Ethics* with the calm declaration, "I have explained the nature of God." Elsewhere, writing to a friend, he expresses his profound conviction of the validity of his philosophy by stating that he knows its propositions to be true with

as much certainty as one knows that the sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles.

It is not my object to enter into the merits and demerits of Spinoza's philosophy, nor to defend nor to attack the truth of such Scriptural teachings as I shall presently have to deal with. My theme here is inconsistency, and nothing else; the logical disagreement between two bodies of doctrine held to be both true, both adhered to and defended by the same person.

Although Spinoza was not a mechanist in the modern materialistic sense, he was nevertheless a mechanist in the sense that he was a thoroughgoing and uncompromising determist, holding that everything happens necessarily as an effect of what happened before, and that every phenomenon, physical or mental, is predetermined from eternity; that is, existed *in potentia*, or as a gradually developing germ, in all the stages of the infinite past. Nor was the process the work of a ruling intelligence, for the existence of such intelligence, as well as of design, or final causes, is explicitly denied. The process may therefore be properly described as mechanical, and God as an eternal mechanism functioning in accordance, not with the dictates of his will, but with certain laws that, although inhering in him, he neither made nor can alter.

A personal God, whether conceived as a being different from the world or as the soul of the world, is logically excluded from Spinoza's philosophy. In particular, the God of the Bible is so excluded; for one of the characteristics of that God is his personality—his direct intervention in the destiny of the world and man; his free, premeditated acts; his human-like attributes of knowledge, mercy, justice, anger, indignation; his intention to fulfill his plans or designs, freely conceived and freely executed. And all that implies this personality, including the phraseology that describes it, is *ipso facto* excluded from that philosophy. For Spinoza to speak of prophecy and revelation, of God's plans and decrees, of God's providence, clemency and solicitude for the welfare of man, and of "Holy Writ" as "the word of God" (these are his own expressions) is a palpable, monstrous and almost inconceivable logical incongruity. And yet he does so speak. When off his guard, he seems to use all the theological terminology in its accustomed sense; but occasionally, remembering the cast-iron principles of his *Ethics*, he alters the meanings of words; so that, in order to reconcile his *Ethics* with his *Theologico-Political Treatise*, in which he "interprets" the Scrip-

tures, a process of philosophical exegesis, more complicated than his theological exegesis, would be necessary.

This very adoption of theological terms, this very attempt at "interpretation," shows the strong theological bias under which Spinoza labors. His philosophy evidently leaves no room for traditional theology nor its nomenclature, nor much less for apologetics. But his education, his associations and the continued action of many centuries of faith in his ancestors had made on him an impression that new, antagonistic conceptions could not suddenly efface. Although he had been expelled from the synagogue and excommunicated as a heretic, he still was a Jew in his heart; and, although not a Christian, he held Jesus in the deepest veneration, as the greatest of the prophets, the true spiritual envoy of God, to whom God revealed himself from soul to soul, not in imagination nor through material signs, as to the prophets of old. One would think, on reading Spinoza's outbursts of piety, often very touching and beautiful, that they were the utterances of the most fervent and orthodox believer. He had inherited the strong religious disposition of his forefathers; he had grown in an atmosphere of implicit faith; in his childhood, he had learned to regard Scripture as the revealed word of God—had learned to believe that before he had even read it, without knowing why, and even before being explicitly taught, because he heard it every day as a matter of course from the mouth of his seniors, saw every day the expression of their feeling of reverence, was called every day to act in accordance with that feeling; and so the feeling grew in him and with him automatically, as a response of the plastic organism, perhaps predisposed by heredity, to the molding action of its medium. This feeling, this faith, he acquired before he knew its real object; figuratively, and perhaps literally speaking, it crystallized in his brain as a permanent or at least very stable element of his mental equipment. Other currents of thought might afterwards enter the brain, and tend to dislodge that feeling, but it was too strong, too well rooted and organized, to be swept away or disintegrated, and, although somewhat weakened, would deflect the impinging currents into the devious channels of fallacy. As a bold rationalist, Spinoza arrived, after long cogitations and through a logico-mathematical machinery of deduction that he thought unerring, at certain conclusions that contradicted his faith; but, it being psychologically and perhaps physiologically impossible for him to discard his faith, he betook himself to the task of harmonizing it with his new thoughts, and to this end elaborated, with

the greatest sincerity, a system of fallacious casuistry, which his overmastering bias caused him to regard and present as logical reasoning.

He approaches his subject with the previous, unshakable feeling that the Bible, in its substance at least, must be true, and that whatever it contains that does not tally with his philosophical theories must be so "interpreted" that there shall be no discrepancy. "Being convinced," he says, "that when I have found a solid proof (of anything or principle), it is impossible that I can ever doubt it, I am certain, even without reading Holy Writ, that Holy Writ cannot contradict it." His purpose therefore was, as the purpose of nearly all interpreters has been, to read into the Bible whatever he thought his reason had already shown him to be true, however much it might be necessary to distort and pervert the text.

Were the account of the first days of the world and man, as given in Genesis, laid before a Hindu, Chinese or Japanese scholar who had previously become a Spinozist, but whose mind had not been molded by Jewish and Christian influences, he would probably discourse somewhat as follows: "I cannot believe that account; for, according to Spinoza's system, which I hold to be true, the world had no beginning; even its present form was not 'made' by an act of free will, because God has no free will. Things cannot have been created nor arranged with deliberation to accomplish the ends stated in the book, because God neither deliberates nor aims at any ends whatever. God cannot have appeared to men, spoken to them and given signs of pleasure and displeasure, because he has no form, no speech, no emotions. He cannot have made man in his image or likeness because he has no image, and even mentally he is not at all like men, having neither will nor intelligence, in the human sense of these terms. The very statement that he made anything contradicts the true nature of God, for he is not separate and different from the world; he *is* the world, and he *becomes* the various forms of nature, not *creates* them. As to the meaning of the book, it cannot be plainer; nor does it require a privileged or scholarly mind to understand it. The book describes the beliefs of a people in a certain stage of development; beliefs that in their substance have been common to all mankind when in that stage. Its contents are just what would naturally be expected in the circumstances. The text is as clear as the light of day, and to put into it a reading different from the literal is to pervert it. Jews and Christians do not pervert our books in that way, but justly take for granted that our books

mean what they say. Neither Jews, Christians nor ourselves distort the accounts transmitted by either written or oral tradition of the beliefs of the ancient Greeks or Romans, Celts or Scandinavians, Aztecs or Incas. We accept them as faithfully depicting the intellectual state of early mankind, not as mysterious hieroglyphics clad in the deceptive garb of plain language requiring many thousands of years to decipher. He who reads the book must, if he is unbiased and would be fair to the past, take it as it reads. If, so reading and taking it, he believes it, he may be right, but then he certainly is not a Spinozist." And our heathen friend would apply the same reasoning to the rest of Scripture. For him there would not be, nor could be, a special revelation, nor a chosen people, nor inspiration, nor personal manifestations of divine power, nor divine commandments, nor sacred books; nor would he use the language of Jewish and Christian theology in describing either physical or mental phenomena.

But Spinoza, having entered the field with the feeling of reverence for Scripture already firmly established as a part of his mental organization, could not but strive to justify it, since it was impossible for him to dispel it. He surrenders his rationalism, his naturalism and his logic when he declares that revelation is something out of human reach, and that yet he was "bound to take it" as he found it in the Bible. He does not say why he was so "bound," nor could he have given any explanation of the fact; for his feeling that the Bible must contain a divine revelation had developed in him as a part of his being, and he took it as a matter of course and of necessity, neither capable of being explained, nor needing to be.

It is true that he handles the prophets with scant respect as to their learning and intelligence; true that he rejects many puerile details, ascribing them to the ignorance of those same prophets, who, *having really and actually received the revelations of God*, transmitted them in terms of their own personal beliefs, or interpreted them in accordance with prevailing conceptions. But this does not prevent him from accepting them as *prophets*, and their utterances, *when properly interpreted*, as "the word of God," especially spoken to them as representatives of the chosen people of Israel. "I firmly believe," he says, "although I do not know it with mathematical certainty, that the prophets held intimate counsel with God and were his faithful ambassadors." And elsewhere: "I do not wish to deny that the laws of the Pentateuch were prescribed by God to the

Hebrews, nor that God spoke to that people, nor that they witnessed a great many wonders unknown to other nations."

This last statement would lead one to conclude that Spinoza actually believed in Scriptural miracles, a conclusion further warranted by his declaration that he believes in the actual apparition, of Jesus to the disciples after his death. Although he says this was a "spiritual" apparition, he does not mean that the disciples imagined it, or saw it with their souls, for he categorically says that anybody else who had been there would no doubt have seen it as vividly as they did. And yet, in other places he rejects miracles as such, but, eager to save as much of the text as possible, accepts for the most part the results as historical facts either embellished or wrongly interpreted by the prophet or writer. Thus, when it is said that a blind mind was miraculously cured, we may believe that he was really cured, although by natural means; when the text says that a dead man was resurrected, the actual fact was that a sick man who seemed dead was cured, also by natural means; when it says that God hardened Pharoah's heart, we are to understand merely that Pharoah was hard-hearted. Even the stopping of the sun by Joshua can, according to Spinoza, be interpreted as a somewhat distorted account of a historical fact. On that day, Scripture itself says, there was "an extraordinary quantity of snow in the air," which, by refraction, may have caused the sun to remain visible longer than usual, thus creating the impression that it had been stopped! So, too, the parting of the waters of the Red Sea was probably a natural phenomenon due to a strong wind blowing from the east! To one not familiar with the law of conflict between feeling and judgment, it would seem inconceivable that the same man was the author of the *Ethics* and of these childish puerilities. Nor is it surprising that, armed with his exegetical machinery, Spinoza declares that he "has discovered nothing in the miracles narrated in Scripture that does not agree with reason," since by miracles he does not understand miracles, but embellished, allegorized or perhaps mistaken accounts of actual facts. In other instances, as in the case of the apparition of Jesus and the wonders witnessed by the Hebrews, he interprets the records literally, while still in another, pressed by his opponents and confronted by his own fundamental principles, he boldly brands the belief in miracles as ignorant superstition. All this makes more chaotic the chaos of his inconsistency, his exegesis constantly contradicting not only his philosophy but itself.

In the *Ethics*, he deprives God of all personality, of all plans, of all intention. But now he speaks of God as any ordinary believer would, admitting in him all those human-like attributes that make him really a person. Thus, in explaining some of the "wonders" already referred to, he, far from denying them, says that they were "but means that God employed to place himself within the reach of men's intelligence and make his wishes known to them." And elsewhere he concurs in the Scriptural teaching that "God's providence is universal, that he wishes the righteous to be rewarded and the unrighteous to be punished, and that our salvation depends on his grace only." Remember that the God of the *Ethics* has no wishes, no feelings, and that in him the distinction between sin and virtue, the righteous and the wicked does not exist.

Of the story of creation, Spinoza disposes with ease and conviction; for, divested of its poetical garb, that story means, and is by God intended to mean, only this: "The Supreme Being caused this sensible world to pass from chaos to order, and placed in it the germs of natural things." In his philosophy, however, there are no such things as chaos and disorder. Leaving aside this inconsistency, his interpretation is in keeping with a tendency, first appearing, if I remember well, in St. Augustine, to harmonize Scripture with natural science; a tendency which has constantly gathered strength with the flow of the ages and the scientific development of civilization. "The history of the theological doctrine of creation is for many centuries the history of natural science," says Dr. Phillip Schaff, the eminent ecclesiastical historian. In this strange process, the facts and accepted theories of science have first been boldly denied, afterwards read into Scripture, and finally substituted for Scripture.

To the method of unconscious, or at least well-intentioned, perversion of the text, Spinoza adds the method of partial elimination, and finally develops a hermeneutical formula which at once shows his reverential feeling for the Bible, his supreme efforts to retain at least something on which that feeling can rationally rest, and his implicit and inconsistent acknowledgement that the Bible must be tested by reason, and where found wanting, discarded. "Everything that is true in the accounts of Scripture," he says, "has happened in accordance with the laws of nature ruling all things; and if anything is found in it obviously contrary to natural laws, one must necessarily believe that it was added to Holy Writ by a sacrilegious hand." One fails to see the value, or feel the authority, of

a book that can occasionally confirm, but never independently teach, the truth.

Had Spinoza, before learning philosophy, remained longer under the influence of the synagogue; had he made theological studies under learned conservative rabbis and developed to manhood under their sway and guidance, he might still have constructed his philosophical system as a product of thought moving temporarily in other than orthodox channels, or, speaking physiologically, by working with another part of the brain than that where orthodoxy had become organized and hardened. The subsequent clash might have been more violent, and yet, for him, equally barren; the fallacies more glaring, and yet equally sincere; the inconsistency more eagerly denied, and yet equally real. And if succeeding generations had continued the conflict, one of the two cerebral areas would now be totally or well-nigh totally invaded by the other, and one of the two opposing forces would now be totally or well nigh totally destroyed by the other. One of the two germs would now be, if not dead, dying, seized with agonizing paroxysms, symptoms not of renewed but of departing vitality.

# IN DEFIANCE OF THE GODS

BY GEORGE BALLARD BOWERS

MY FIRST sight of Samar was a bare, gray peak, piercing a dense cloud bank like a huge horn. "That's Hurao," volunteered the captain of the Masbate. Immediately I assumed an attitude of attention to encourage him to go on. I sensed an interesting story and, moreover, I was enroute for field duty with troops operating on the island we were approaching.

"That peak has never been conquered," he began. "Hurao is an abode of the gods. The Filipinos have surrounded it with a glamor of mystery and superstitious fear." Here the captain's story was cut short, he had been called to the bridge, and an hour later I was ashore.

Samar was seething in revolt; thus it happened that within a month I was at the foot of Mount Hurao. I thought of the captain's story and the hundred finished versions from the natives in the streets of Catbalogan. They had told of legendary guardians, half human and half fish, but now none were to be found. My guide assured me the monsters had once lived in a village in the center of a great hemp jungle where we found charred remains of hovels.

When I suggested that we scale the peak, my guide protested wildly, warning me that no American or Spaniard or Filipino had ever been able to reach the top, winds of a dangerous velocity had always compelled the climbers to give up. Only a few months before, he explained, a doubting Filipino official essayed an ascent only to be forced to abandon his attempt, the winds had been too strong.

Here was my chance to disprove the fiction of the gods and become a hero of the simple mountaineers. Later I was to learn that they considered men fools who defy the gods.

Twenty soldiers volunteered to accompany me. The ascent was easy. We ate our noon-day meal on the summit, eight thousand feet above sea level.

We encountered the mythical wind about half way up and, at the summit, as may be expected in the tropics, it was a steady gale, although not of such force as to endanger our climb. The extreme top was a bare rock, three sides perpendicular, fifty feet high, the fourth was a slope of soft earth covered with a mat of vines over which we ascended.

The view from that mountain height was wonderful to behold. Northward in the distance, a ribbon of white smoke curled heavenward from the eternal fires of Bulasan; in the east was the vast, sighing Pacific; south, the mysterious mountains of Mindanao and in the west, the blue of the China Sea. A lively crackle of rifle-fire below me brought me back to my narrow world, forgetting the rare rock orchids I had gathered, I slid off the summit to hurry down to camp to find my men none the worse for the insurgent attack in my absence.

A year later chance brought me back to Hurao. This time I found the legendary guardians in their squalid cluster of grass huts. Half man, half fish? No, but everyone had ichthyosis, fish-scale disease, loathesome and incurable, that turns the human skin into a mass of glistening white scales, making clothing an irritating impossibility. Filipinos afflicted with fish-scale live like lepers, outcasts of clean society. I told the chief of the clan that I intended to ascend Hurao again.

"Again? No man has yet been able to reach the home of the ancestral gods!" He laughed doubtfully when I insisted that I had made a former trip. As I was about to go on, he fell on his knees imploring me to give up my plan that the wrath of the gods might not be visited upon us and his people, guardians of Hurao. His pleas were pathetic. I pitied the poor wretch already miserable and doomed to a living death.

Ten o'clock found us within fifty feet of our goal with further progress blocked. The recent rains had dissolved the earth incline over which we had ascended on our former visit. The four sides were now equally bare and perpendicular. All my attempts to scale the walls were futile, the jutting rocks were covered with a slimy moss that made climbing impossible.

I had to pass the outcast settlement on my return. The loathesome chief was waiting, grinning he began, "O wise white man, didst I not warn thee that only fools and children defy the gods?"

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